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1,6
1,5

ISSUE PRESENTED

Pursuant to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' Order Certifying State Law Questions dated March 2, 2012, and this Court's Order of Acceptance dated March 13, 2012,
the following question has been certified to this Court pursuant to UTAH R. APP. P. 41:
Under Utah preclusion law, is the Utah Supreme Court's discretionary review of a petition for extraordinary writ and subsequent dismissal on laches
grounds a decision "on the merits" when it is accompanied by a written
opinion, such that later adjudication of the same claim is barred?
STATEMENT O F T H E C A S E

Appellee adopts the statement of the case in the Tenth Circuit certification order,
which is included as Addendum A to this brief.
SUMMARY O F A R G U M E N T

When a federal court certifies a question of state law to this Court, both the Utah
Constitution and this Court's rules limit this Court's jurisdiction to answering the question of law presented. UTAH CONST., art. VIII, § 3; UTAH R. APP. P. 41; Burkholtz v.
Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 1236 (Utah 1998).
The general question of state law the Tenth Circuit has certified to this Court centers on the preclusive effect of denial of a petition for extraordinary writ under Utah law
when the denial is accompanied by a written opinion. The specific question before the
federal courts—the preclusive effect of this Court's decision in Fundamentalist Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, 238 P.3d 1054—will be
answered by the Tenth Circuit, based upon law applicable in that system of courts, inDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

formed as it may deem appropriate by this Court's answer to the certified question. It
would be beyond the certified question, and beyond the limited constitutional grant of jurisdiction to this Court in answering the question, for this Court to opine specifically as to
the preclusive effect of Lindberg.

j

The characteristics of extraordinary writ jurisdiction itself dictate that denial of a
petition for extraordinary writ is not a decision on the underlying merits. Like with writs
i
of certiorari, the reviewing court has absolute discretion to grant or deny the writ, and
may deny the writ even where the underlying decision from which relief is sought is demonstrably wrong. State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, \ 23, 127 P.3d 682 ("Unlike a party

fil-

<

ing a direct appeal, a petitioner seeking rule 65B(d) extraordinary relief has no right to
receive a remedy that corrects a lower court's mishandling of a particular case."). Standi

ing alone, therefore, the denial of the writ does not indicate any decision on the underlying merits.
The certified question asks whether the presence of a written decision changes this
general rule. This concern appears to be based on an old constitutional provision, relied
upon by Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978), requiring Supreme Court decisions to be in writing. That provision is no longer in effect, however, and Appellee respectfully submits that the presence of a written opinion, standing
i

alone, is neither necessary nor sufficient to determine the preclusive effect of the decision.
Instead, where the court gives a written explanation of the reasons for dismissing a
petition for extraordinary writ, the preclusive effect of the dismissal depends upon the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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,

express terms of the writing as well as the nature of the case and the circumstances of the
denial. The written opinion may itself state that the court did not reach the underlying
merits. In the absence of such an expression of intent, the denial must be analyzed in
terms of the underlying context.
In considering the nature of the case and the circumstances of the denial in context, several factors inform the analysis. First, the petitioner in extraordinary writ proceedings may or may not be a party to the underlying case. Indeed, non-party status in
the underlying case is one of the acknowledged bases for determination that the petitioner
has no other adequate remedy, making review by extraordinary writ appropriate. See Society of Prof. Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah 1987).
This in turn bears on the second factor, which is the extent to which the laches determination is based on actual litigation of the underlying facts. This Court is not a factfinding court. Thus, because laches is a factual determination, one must look elsewhere
to see if a proper factual determination was made in a setting where there was adequate
participation by all affected parties such that the requirements of due process and opportunity to litigate were satisfied. Where the petitioner is a non-party to the underlying
case, any underlying factual claims must necessarily be immediately suspect.
Third, because extraordinary writ review is entirely discretionary, the refusal of
the petitioned court to accept the case does not by itself permit any conclusions to be
drawn concerning the underlying merits. Thus, absent clear evidence of other factors
suggesting that a merits review was possible and was actually completed, a refusal to accept the writ petition based on laches is only preclusive as to subsequent requests for exDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

traordinary relief. Gates v. Taylor, 2000 UT 33, ^ 2, 997 P.2d 903 (per curiam). This is
consistent with general law holding that limitations and laches dismissals are generally
not considered to be on the merits unless the express language or necessary, specific,
properly developed factual findings dictate otherwise. Both Day v. Estate of Wiswall, 93

^

Ariz. 400, 381 P.2d 217, 220 (1963); and Johnson v. City ofLoma Linda, 24 Cal.4th 61,
99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 316, 5 P.3d 874 (2000), cited by the Tenth Circuit in the certification or\

der, apply this view.
Finally, consistent with the discretionary nature of extraordinary writ review, one
must carefully analyze the denial to ascertain whether a true and thorough laches analysis
was applied. This would include determination of applicable facts as described above,
but also actual weighing and balancing of relative harms and prejudice to all participants
in the litigation, as required by Utah law when a laches defense is asserted.
ARGUMENT

I.

THIS COURT HAS ALREADY DECIDED LINDBERG AND
SHOULD NOT MODIFY OR COMMENT ON IT IN
ANSWERING THE CERTIFIED QUESTION.
A.

Utah Law Confines This Court to Answering Abstract Questions of Law In the Certification Process

This Court's statement in FLDS Church, "[t]he FLDS Association's Trust modification claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of laches

Accordingly, we decline

to reach the merits of these claims and dismiss the FLDS Association's Petition for Extraordinary Writ," has obviously generated considerable controversy in the federal litigation. While one might argue that Lindberg in a sense commented on the laches defense

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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I

in the context of the "trust modification claims," this Court nevertheless explicitly stated
that it did not reach the merits of the claims. Appellants have argued that, despite their
having asked the Court not to reach the merits of Appellee's underlying claims, and despite the Court's having granted that request by expressly declining to reach those merits,
the Court should be viewed as having reached them anyway. Judge Benson has concluded that those merits were not adjudicated.
The certification process, however, does not permit revisitation of Lindberg, nor
should the Court in answering the certified question attempt to further clarify the holding,
basis, or preclusive effect of that prior decision. The certification process is limited to
answering questions of state law. According to UTAH R. APP. P. 41, "[t]he Utah Supreme
court may answer a question of Utah law certified to it

" The specific requirements

for an order of certification emphasize and reinforce that certified questions are restricted
to questions of law. See id., Rule 41(c) (a certification order must state "the question of
law to be answered," that this question "is a controlling issue of law in a proceeding
pending before the certifying court," and that "no controlling Utah law" is apparent) (em-

At oral argument on Appellee's extraordinary writ petition in Lindberg, the following
colloquy took place:
[CHIEF JUSTICE] DURHAM: In that your argument is focusing
on the merits of the reformation of the trust. I'm assuming the fiduciary
does not take the position that this extraordinary writ should be decided on
the merits.
MR. SHIELDS: No. We believe the extraordinary writ should be
dismissed. (App. 4136-37.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

phasis added). Confinement of the certification process to questions of law is jurisdici
tional. UTAH CONST., art. VIII, § 3 ("The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction
. . . to answer questions of state law certified by a court of the United States."); see Holden v. NL Industries, Inc., 629 P.2d 428, 431-32 (Utah 1981) (Utah Supreme Court has ju-

i

risdiction to consider certified questions only to the extent authorized by the Utah Constitution).
d

It would be a misuse of the certification process to ask this Court to decide the
preclusive effect of one of its past decisions in a federal case. When preclusive effect is
at issue, the "first court does not get to dictate to other courts the preclusion consequences

(

of its own judgment." 18 C. A. Wright, et al, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4405,
at 82 (2007) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER]; accord Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S.Ct.
((

2368, 2375 (2011) ("Deciding whether and how prior litigation has preclusive effect is
usually the bailiwick of the second court.") (emphasis in original).
B.

The Question of Law Accepted By This Court Does Not Permit Modification or Explanation of Lindberg,

*

The Tenth Circuit observed the jurisdictional limitations on the certification process by rejecting Appellants' respective requests to certify to this Court whether Lindberg
precluded Appellee's federal action.2 Instead, the Circuit certified an abstract question of

See Motion to Certify of Appellant Home, at 4-5 (arguing for certification of the question of "the preclusive effect of the Lindberg judgment"); Motion to Certify of Appellants
Wisan & Lindberg, at 2 (arguing for certification of "whether a prior decision of the Utah
Supreme Court rejecting the attempt of Plaintiff-Appellee to raise the same constitutional
claims at issue here on laches grounds should be given res judicata effect").
Appellant Shurtleff moved for certification of a properly abstract question of law, Motion
to Certify of Appellant Shurtleff, at 3, but also improperly urged the Tenth Circuit to ask
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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i{

Utah law—whether a laches dismissal of a petition for extraordinary writ precludes later
adjudication of the underlying claims when accompanied by written opinion. This question does not ask, nor should it permit, this Court to comment on the effect of the Lindberg decision or to clarify what this Court meant in Lindberg or, indeed, to discuss Lindberg at all.
In short, this Court lacks jurisdiction to decide whether Lindberg precludes Appellee's federal action, and it has not been asked to do so. It is for the Tenth Circuit to determine the preclusive effect (if any) of Lindberg within the federal court system, in the
same manner that the preclusive effect of any prior decision is determined—by reading
and analyzing the opinion in light of relevant state law, including this Court's answer to
the certified question.
II.

DISMISSAL OF AN EXTRAORDINARY WRIT PETITION IS
NOT A JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS HAVING PRECLUSIVE
EFFECT.
A.

The General Rule.

Denials of extraordinary writs do not preclude subsequent litigation of the underlying substantive claims. 18A WRIGHT & MILLER, § 4445, at 306-07.
Where the extraordinary jurisdiction of a court is unsuccessfully invoked
and the court does not expressly adjudicate the tendered merits issue, the
general rule is that there is no preclusive effect and the petitioning party is
free subsequently to pursue his claim in any appropriate forum.

this Court to explain the preclusive effect of Lindberg. Ld., at 4-5 (suggesting that this
Court be "given the opportunity to review the question or at the very least clarify any
ambiguity in [its] Lindberg decision."); see also Opening Br. of Appellant Shurtleff, at 12
("The legal question is whether Utah courts would give preclusive effect to Lindberg.").
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

FOCUSv. Allegheny Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 842 (3d Cir. 1996) (applying Pennsylvania law). Accord, United States v. Holland, 66 F.3d 339 (10th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished opinion) (denial of mandamus relief had no preclusive effect on claims argued in petition because standards for obtaining such relief "are harder to meet than
merely showing reversible error on direct appeal.") (applying federal law); Hiley v. United States, 807 F.2d 623, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Dean, 752 F.2d
535, 541 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Denial of a writ commonly rests on severe limitations of jurisdiction and discretion that prevent the court from applying ordinary tests of reversible error. If a decision is confined by these limitations, it should not preclude examination of
the merits in later proceedings. Preclusion is appropriate only if denial rested on the merits of the questions presented rather than remedial limitations.").
If the merits of claims underlying an extraordinary writ are considered at all (and
they often are not), they are considered only in light of much more difficult and restrictive standards for granting relief than are applicable to normal consideration under a
court's mandatory jurisdiction. The denial of an extraordinary writ, therefore, cannot
have preclusive effect on the merits of the underlying claims in another forum invoking a
court's mandatory jurisdiction, because those merits were not adjudicated in the writ proceeding under the more permissive standards applicable to discretionary jurisdiction.
B.

Adoption by Utah Case Law.

To a significant extent, Utah law already reflects the general rule. For example,
this Court has characterized petitions for extraordinary writ as comparable to petitions for
certiorari. State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, f 24, 127 P.3d 682; Renn v. Board of Pardons,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995). A denial of a petition for certiorari is not a judgment on
the merits of the underlying substantive claims. E.g., Maryland v. Baltimore Radio
Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950) ("[DJenial of a petition for certiorari "carries with it no
implication whatever regarding the Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined to review"); 16B WRIGHT & MILLER § 4004.1, at 34 (same). Therefore, because
denial of certiorari review has no preclusive effect on later litigation of the underlying
claims, neither should denial of extraordinary writ petitions have preclusive effect on
such claims.
This Court has held that the grant of extraordinary writ petitions is subject to the
same limitations of jurisdiction and discretion that prohibit a finding of preclusive effect
under the general rule. Unlike a court exercising mandatory jurisdiction, a Utah court
considering a petition for extraordinary writ is never required to take jurisdiction, even
when it is clear that the petitioner has suffered undoubted constitutional wrongs. Barrett,
2005 UT 88, Tf 23 ("Unlike a party filing a direct appeal, a petitioner seeking rule 65B(d)
extraordinary relief has no right to receive a remedy that corrects a lower court's mishandling of a particular case."). Proof of such violations merely makes the petitioner "eligible" for discretionary relief. Id., % 24 (a petitioner for extraordinary writ who "is able to
establish that a lower court abused its discretion" is "eligible for, but not entitled to, extraordinary relief.").
A Utah court considering a petition for extraordinary writ has discretion to decline
jurisdiction and dismiss the writ even when the petitioner establishes that the lower court
committed material errors of constitutional law. E.g., Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, If 24; BarDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

rett, 2005 UT 88, \ 24. Therefore, a Utah court exercising mandatory appellate jurisdic.

.

i

tion is obligated to correct constitutional errors below, whereas a court exercising discretionary jurisdiction has no such obligation. In other words, a Utah court has complete
discretion to deny a petition for extraordinary relief, even when the petition decisively
demonstrates that another court has committed indisputable errors of fundamental law.

^

Cf. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, \ 23 (observing that relief on a petition for extraordinary writ is
I
"more difficult to obtain" than relief on direct appeal).
Because the ordinary standards of mandatory jurisdiction, appellate review, and
reversible error prescribed by this Court's precedents do not apply to extraordinary writ

«

petitions, denial of those writs cannot (as a matter of logic) and should not (as a matter of
fairness) preclude subsequent litigation of the underlying substantive issues.
i

Denial of a writ commonly rests on severe limitations of jurisdiction and
discretion that prevent the court from applying ordinary tests of reversible
error. If a decision is confined by these limitations, it should not preclude
examination of the merits in later proceedings. Preclusion is appropriate
only if denial rested on the merits of the questions presented rather than
remedial limitations.

{<

18A WRIGHT & MILLER, § 4445, at 306-07 This would be true whether or not the denial
j

is accompanied by a written opinion.
In sum, this Court has already implicitly adopted the general rule that dismissal or
denial of extraordinary writ petitions has no preclusive effect.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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III.

THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF A LACHES DISMISSAL OF AN
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT PETITION TURNS ON WHETHER A
COURT FOUND THE NECESSARY FACTS AND APPLIED
THE REQUIRED LEGAL ELEMENTS, NOT ON WHETHER
THE DECISION WAS IN WRITING.
A.

Because This Court Is Not a Fact-Finding Court, Its Rejection of an Extraordinary Writ Petition Cannot Resolve the
Underlying Merits Except In Unusual Circumstances.

This Court is not a fact-finding court. See State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("It is not the function of the appellate court to try the facts or substitute for the trial court in the determination of factual issues.") (quoting United States v.
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1521 (10th Cir. 1989)). Laches is a question of fact:
To constitute laches, two elements must be established: (1) The lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff; (2) An injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence. Although lapse of time is an essential part of laches, the length of time
must depend on the circumstances of each case, for the propriety of refusing a
claim is equally predicated upon the gravity of the prejudice suffered by defendant
and the length of plaintiff s delay.
Papanikolas Bros. Ents. v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260
(Utah 1975), cited with approval in Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, ^f 28 ("In determining whether to apply the doctrine of laches, we consider the relative harm caused by the petitioner's
delay, the relative harm to the petitioner, and whether or not the respondent acted in good
faith"). Accordingly, "[t]he existence of laches is one to be determined primarily by the
trial court; and reviewing courts will not interfere with the exercise of the trial court's
discretion in the matter, unless it appears that a manifest injustice has been done, or the
decision cannot reasonably be found to be supported by the evidence." 535 P.2d at 1260
(emphasis added).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Under Utah law, appellate courts have original jurisdiction over petitions for extraordinary writs. Therefore, if another court has not created a proper evidentiary record,
the factual issues raised by the laches defense must be litigated before the appellate court
for a dismissal of the petition for laches to have preclusive effect. Otherwise, there is no
factual basis for the laches defense, but merely assertion and conjecture.
It follows from the foregoing authorities that the res judicata effect of a dismissal
of an extraordinary writ petition based on laches depends not on whether the decision was
in writing, but on the context in which the issue arises. If the facts underlying the laches
defense were not litigated, then the binding effect of the determination cannot extend beyond preclusion of subsequent requests for extraordinary relief because the dismissal was
not based on a factual inquiry. Cf. WRIGHT & MILLER, § 4445, at 305-06 ("Preclusion is
proper [when a court denies a preliminary injunction] so long as the parties have had a
full opportunity to advance all of the evidence and arguments that would be available at
full-scale trial on the merits.").
The only way claims can be adjudicated is by reaching the merits through a
presentation of evidence. The decision of this Court not to exercise its discretion to grant
a writ petition, therefore, cannot preclude relief where the preclusion would be based on
facts which were never litigated in any forum.
B.

Utah Law No Longer Requires That Merits Decisions Be In
Writing.

The certification order appears to be related in part to a question concerning the
continuing viability of the decision of this Court in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake
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County, 575 P.2d 705, 708 (Utah 1978). In that case, the Court had, "in a minute entry,
dismissed the petition [for extraordinary writ] without stating any reason." 575 P.2d at
707. The Court held:
The minute entry was not a decision on the merits. Had it been, Article VII, Section 25, Constitution of Utah, requires such a decision, and the
reasons therefor be stated concisely in writing. . . . A judgment denying a
writ of prohibition without written opinion is not res judicata unless the sole
possible ground of the denial was that the court acted on the merits, or unless it affirmatively appears the denial was intended to be on the merits.
Since neither exception applies, the matter was not res judicata.
Id. at 707-08.
The constitutional reference is to a provision that no longer exists. It was originally contained in Article VIII, § 25 of the 1896 Constitution, as follows:
When a judgment or decree is reversed, modified or affirmed by the Supreme Court, the reasons therefor shall be stated concisely in writing,
signed by the judges concurring, filed in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and preserved with a record of the case. Any judge dissenting
therefrom, may give the reasons of his dissent in writing over his signature.
With this constitutional provision no longer extant, the primary reasoning of the
Court, that without a writing the decision could not be on the merits without violating the
constitution, is no longer good law. The remaining statement of the Court in Kennecott,
that res judicata would only apply if a merits denial was the only possible grounds, or if
it affirmatively appears that action on the merits was intended, is taken directly from an
American Law Reports annotation discussion of the preclusive effect of a minute entry
denial. 21 A.L.R. 3d 206, §§ 12, 18.
The principle that a minute entry denial is presumptively not a decision on the
merits, however, does not establish the converse proposition that a denial with a written
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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opinion is presumptively on the merits, especially in light of the fact that the constitution
no longer requires merits decisions to be in writing. Instead, the questions asked in
Kennecott must still be answered: does it affirmatively appear that the denial was intended to be on the merits, or is that the only possible conclusion given the grounds for deni-

j

al? The written opinion is only significant insofar as it offers clues for answering those
questions. This is the answer to the limited question asked by the Tenth Circuit, and the
I

proper inquiry, then, is the same as it is in any case in which res judicata is asserted.
This Court's ample precedents on claim preclusion should be applied in that court, not
this Court, to ascertain the preclusive effect of Lindberg.
C.

I

The Day and Johnson Cases Cited By the Tenth Circuit Both
Adhere to the Rule That Preclusion Turns on the Nature of
the Underlying Factual Inquiry.

The Tenth Circuit's certification order specifically discusses two cases, Day v. Estate ofWiswall, 93 Ariz. 400, 381 P.2d 217, 220 (1963); and Johnson v. City ofLoma
Linda, 24 Cal.4th 61, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 316, 5 P.3d 874 (2000). Both cases were ordinary
appeals from trial court decisions, not extraordinary writ petitioner. Johnson applied the
majority view discussed above, that laches is a defense which does not reach the merits of
si

the case for preclusion purposes even when a court has mandatory jurisdiction. 5 P.3d at
884.
In Day, the Arizona court held that a prior California dismissal based on laches
was on the merits and thus res judicata for the Arizona action. The California dismissal,
however, was not simply a discretionary refusal to reach the merits. Rather, following a
frill trial on the merits of plaintiff s claim to the estate of a decedent who had died over 50
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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years earlier, the California court found: "The separate and community interests [which
plaintiff seeks to reach] * * * have been so intermingled over the period of approximately
56 years that it would now be inequitable to segregate and evaluate such interest separately, and for such delay plaintiff is guilty of laches insofar as she seeks relief...." 381
P.2d at 220. The Arizona court accordingly held: "The judgment in the California suit
was not one of dismissal, but, after a full hearing and consideration of evidence and a
finding of laches as a fact, was that the plaintiff take nothing by reason of the actions. It
was therefore a judgment on the merits." Id. (emphasis added).
Day is thus consistent with the general rule that laches dismissals lack preclusive
effect unless they fully litigate the merits under normal standards of proof. In contrast,
where a court did not take evidence and find facts in a fairly litigated adversarial proceeding, as is usually the case in a petition for extraordinary writ, a laches dismissal cannot
operate as a dismissal on the merits which binds a court in a different jurisdiction.
D.

There Can Be No Preclusive Effect When the Legal Elements
of Laches Have Not Been Weighed and Balanced Against
Each Other.

Under Utah law, a finding of laches requires a court to balance the relative harm to
the defendant from plaintiffs delay against the relative harm to plaintiff if his or her substantive claims are not adjudicated. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, f 28; Papanikolas Bros., 535
P.2d at 1260. Because a Utah court considering a petition for extraordinary writ has unconstrained discretion to dismiss the writ for any reason or for no reason, it may do so
without engaging in the full laches balance. Failure to do so, however, would prevent the
dismissal from precluding subsequent litigation of the underlying claims.
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Whether the harm to the plaintiff from a court's refusal to adjudicate the merits of
plaintiffs claims outweighs the harm to defendant from plaintiffs delay depends on a determination of the nature and gravity of the violations of law alleged in those claims.
That determination, in turn, requires express consideration of the merits of those claims

<

in the court's opinion dismissing for laches, so as to determine their seriousness and the
degree of harm that plaintiff might suffer if the court does not adjudicate them. A court's
failure to expressly discuss, assess, and weigh the merits of the underlying claims in its
opinion is functionally equivalent to dismissing those claims without opinion.
IV.

SHOULD THIS COURT DECIDE TO DISCUSS THE
PRECLUSIVE EFFECT OF LINDBERG, IT SHOULD FIND
UNDER THE FOREGOING PRINCIPLES THAT LINDBERG
WAS NOT A DECISION ON THE MERITS HAVING
PRECLUSIVE EFFECT.

i

Appellee argued at Point I above that this Court lacks the power to determine the
preclusive effect of Lindberg in this certification proceeding. Recognizing that the Appellants nevertheless will likely ask this Court to decide the possible preclusive effect of
Lindberg, Appellee offers the following application to Lindberg of the principles discussed in Points II and III above.
First, writ petitions are not appeals, but rather original proceedings in the appellate
court. As such, they may or may not come to the appellate court with a fully developed
record upon which the court might rely for factual findings. As noted above, a finding of
laches depends upon facts: The reasons for the delay, the surrounding circumstances, and
the consequences of the delay to the various stakeholders in the litigation. The appellate
court is not equipped to take evidence and may not find facts. A trial court can engage in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that inquiry, but in the present case it must be recalled that Appellee was denied standing
to intervene in the underlying action in Third District Court; thus, no mechanism existed
for the trial court to take such evidence in an adversarial proceeding and otherwise in a
manner which would bind Appellee.
The Lindberg decision did not involve an appeal, nor did it involve an evidentiary
record. It was an original proceeding in which the FLDS Association, as a non-party to
the underlying case, sought to invoke this Court's discretionary jurisdiction. No evidence
was ever taken concerning the prejudicial impact of delay, or how such impact might be
mitigated.
Second, this Court did not balance all the required factors in Lindberg. Specifically, this Court did not identify, assess, discuss, or weigh Appellee's legal arguments. And
finally, the legal claims underlying Appellee's extraordinary writ petition included a
structural violation of the Establishment Clause which is not subject to balancing or
waiver.
Appellee respectfully submits that the federal court's analysis of the preclusive effect of this Court's Lindberg decision on the prior-filed federal court action correctly applied the relevant principles of preclusion and constitutional law.
A.

Traditional Res Judicata Analysis Leads to the Conclusion
This Court's Dismissal of the Petition for Extraordinary Writ
on the Basis of Laches Was Not a Judgment on the Merits.

The doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion are related. Insofar as pertinent here, a requirement of both branches of res judicata is that the issue or claim
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sought to be precluded was fully and fairly litigated on the merits to a final conclusion.
This Court has described the requirements of the two doctrines as follows:
Claim preclusion bars a cause of action only if the suit in which that
cause of action is being asserted and the prior suit satisfy three requirements. First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the
first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first
action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits.
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988).
Under the rules of issue preclusion, the adjudication of an issue bars its
relitigation in another action only if four requirements are met. First, the
issue in both cases must be identical. Second, the judgment must be final
with respect to that issue. Third, the issue must have been fully, fairly, and
competently litigated in the first action. Fourth, the party who is precluded
from litigating the issue must be either a party to the first action or a privy
of a party.
Id., at 250.
The U.S. District Court reasoned that, if the doctrine of laches was applicable at
all (a point that court did not concede because of the ongoing and structural nature of the
constitutional violations), a decision on the merits of that issue would have balanced the
third-party consequences of delay against the extraordinary and ongoing violation of
structural constitutional limitations and constitutional rights created by administration of
the reformed trust. (App. 51-52.)
The federal court then spent several pages of its decision scrutinizing Lindberg for
signs that this Court had thoroughly considered the "harm to the petitioner," which of
course requires an analysis of the merits of the petitioner's substantive claims to ascertain
the nature and "gravity of the prejudice suffered" by the petitioner, and found none:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the FLDS case, however, aside from the Utah Supreme Court's bare
statement that laches entails a consideration of "the relative harm to the petitioner," the court undertakes no assessment of any kind whatsoever as to
whether the plaintiffs' claims of serious constitutional violations had any
merit at all. There is no attention given to whether the state district court's
reformation of the Trust was in violation of the First Amendment or whether the day-to-day administration and management of the Trust property
constituted the ongoing serious constitutional violations on which the plaintiffs' case was based. Attention was devoted solely to discussing the delay
and the alleged prejudice caused by the delay. Under these circumstances,
the "merits" of plaintiffs' case were not considered. The "relative harm to
the petitioner" (the plaintiffs) was not even mentioned. As a result, the
plaintiffs have not yet had a forum in which their claims of serious constitutional violations have been entertained or addressed sufficiently to earn a
finding that they were on the merits. (App. 61-62.)
The federal court did not say or imply that this Court misapplied the doctrine of
laches, but simply recognized the more restrictive jurisdictional and review standards that
apply to extraordinary writ petitions under Rule 65B. In this Court's own words, "even
if the FLDS Association shows that the district court abused its discretion, extraordinary
'[r]elief under rule 65B(d)(2) is completely at the discretion of [this court].'" 2010 UT
51, If 24 (editing by the Court).

Judge Benson stated:
My main reason or one of my main reasons for not finding res judicata effect is because they claim in this case that laches in Utah considered harm
to the petitioner, the person bringing the claim, and they didn't address that
more than they did, which was their entitlement, as I understand their law
pertaining to the petition for an extraordinary writ, and was completely
within their rights and jurisdiction as I see it, but that is not my job. I'm a
totally different sovereign. I am a court in a totally different sovereign and
situation. (App. 182.)
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In other words, this Court was not required to thoroughly assess the merits in dismissing the writ petition for laches. Even if—as the fiduciary claimed in his arguments
to the federal court—this Court had assumed the validity of the petitioners' merits arguments, it could deny what was completely discretionary relief. On the FLDS Association
members' motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, however,
the federal court was required to thoroughly assess and weigh the merits in the laches
balance.
Unlike Lindberg, Judge Benson did not have discretion to dismiss the case before
him, and so independently weighed those merits to decide whether laches was an appropriate defense to the federal claims. (App. 51-56.) After actually weighing the merits,
the court found no basis for application of the doctrine of laches:
To apply laches in this situation would be to place the violation
of the First Amendment behind the fees and expenses of the very state actors, and those of the (mostly) former, and now disaffected, members of the
FLDS church who have encouraged the state actors to take over the Trust.
If the defendants are in territory where they are constitutionally not permitted to be, the law should require their eviction, not sanction their continued
presence just so they can be paid for the invasion. (App. 55-56.)
The federal court's independent weighing of the merits was not precluded by this
Court's decision in Lindberg, where Appellee's participation was barred below and
where the merits were not weighed in this Court. Accordingly, the federal court's determination that the laches ruling did not have preclusive effect on the substantive federal

4

The court also held that "[T]he tort lawsuit settlements certainly can be dealt with by
the same legal system that one would expect to be able to allow these plaintiffs to somewhere obtain a ruling on the merits of their constitutional claims." (Id., p. 55.)
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constitutional claims was appropriate, legally correct, and within that court's jurisdiction
to decide.
B.

Because Defendants' Actions Violate Structural Constraints
Imposed by the Establishment Clause, Laches Is Not a Proper
Defense to the Underlying Claims.

Finally, the establishment clause violations of which the FLDS Association complains are structural constitutional violations which, as will be demonstrated below, are
not subject to equitable defenses such as waiver or laches. As limitations on government
power, they are—like subject matter jurisdiction—able to be raised at any time. As
Judge Benson noted:
[0]n the current state of the record the case for laches is not made. This is
especially true given this court's view, as expressed above, that the defendants' actions were, and continue to be, in clear violation of the Establishment Clause and most likely in violation of the Free Exercise rights of the
plaintiffs. On the present state of the record, it would be inequitable in the
extreme to dismiss this case in its entirety on the basis of laches and thereby
allow these serious constitutional violations to multiply and get worse.
(App. 55.)
The passage of time, even with reliance, does not validate an otherwise prohibited governmental exercise of power.
1.

The Constitution's Structural Limitations.

"Structural" constitutional restraints arise from the constitution's division of power between the states and the federal government and its branches. See Philip Bobbitt,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION

230 (1982); e.g., THE FEDERAL-

IST No. 9 (Hamilton), at 51 (Jacob E. Cook ed. 1961); id., No. 47 (Madison), at 323; id,
No. 51 (Madison), at 351. Constitutional structure allocates sovereign power, granting it
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to or withholding it from the states or the federal government.

I Laurence Tribe,
i

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 2-3, at 125-26 (3d ed. 2000); e.g., Dennis v. Hig-

gins, 498 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) ("[T]he Commerce Clause is a structural provision allocating authority between federal and state sovereignties.") (Kennedy, J., concurring).

j

Structural constitutional restraints function as absolute disabilities on government,
denying it power to act at all in connection with to certain subject matters. Unlike person4
al constitutional rights, which may be waived by their holders or set aside to protect compelling government interests, structural restraints are not subject to waiver or interestbalancing, because they delineate non-transgressable limits on government action. See,
e.g., City ofN.Y. v. Clinton, 524 U.S. 417, 452 (1998) (presentment and bi-cameral veto);
(Kennedy, J., concurring); Commodity Futures Trading Commyn v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
850-51 (1986) (Article III jurisdiction); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13, 951-59
(1983) (presentment and bi-cameral enactment). As the Supreme Court suggested in a
famous dictum, structural constitutional prohibitions "go to the very root of the power of
Congress to act at all, irrespective of time or place." Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
277 (1901); see also id. at 297-98 (concurring opinion) (describing Establishment Clause
and other First Amendment norms as "absolute withdrawals of power which the Constitution has made in favor of human liberty" and which "are applicable to every condition or
status.). Such structural constraints cannot be waived or balanced away.
The violation of structural restraints may properly be raised at any time. Like a
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, government action in the face of a constitutional denial of power cannot be cured by the passage of time or even a compelling government inDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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terest. And if harm to a compelling government interests is not sufficient to justify violations of structural restraints, then a fortiori individual harm is insufficient as well.
Laches, of course, is based on a balance of harms to the parties from the plaintiffs
delay in bringing a legal claim. It follows, then, that laches is never an adequate defense
to violations of the Constitution's structural restraints.
2.

The Establishment Clause as Structural Limitation.

The Establishment Clause violations alleged by Appellee in Lindberg and in its
federal action are structural. The Establishment Clause has long been characterized as an
absolute structural limit on government action that is not subject to waiver or balancing.
E.g., Borden v. School Dist, 523 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2008) (applying interest-balancing to
speech and free exercise but not Establishment Clause claims); Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1266 (10th Cir. 2005) ("Establishment Clause violations . . . are usually flatly forbidden without reference to the strength of governmental
purposes."); South Ridge Bapt. Ch. v. Industrial Comm'n, 911 F.2d 1203, 1206 (6th Cir.
1990) (applying interest-balancing to free exercise but not Establishment Clause entanglement claim); Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421, 433 n.32 (D. Conn. 1970) (private
religious schools may not waive Establishment Clause entanglement claims to receive
public funds); State v. Gaydos, 81 S.W.3d 186, 192 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (the Religion
Clauses constitute "a limitation on civil court jurisdiction over disputes which are either
essentially religious in nature or are sufficiently intertwined with church polity as to constitute a threat of entanglement with religious doctrine or practice."). See generally, Carl
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H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Constraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 33-60 (1998).
The Establishment Clause prohibits state governments from composing prayers,
e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), or teaching religion in the public schools, e.g.,
McCollum v. Board ofEduc, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), or endorsing Christianity, e.g., ACLU
v. City & Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. 573 (1989), or interpreting or applying theology,
Serbian E. Orth. Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) or engaging in innumerable other actions relating to religious belief and practice, even if no one objects and regardless of the strength of the government's reasons for doing so.
In the present case, Appellants may not violate the Establishment Clause's structural limitations imposed on their administration of the UEP Trust, even assuming that
they had good reason to do so and those affected by the conduct did not object. The existence and operation of the Trust are at the core of FLDS religious exercise and belief.
The creation and administration of the Trust, moreover, are expressly rooted in the FLDS
theology of consecration and stewardship. Accordingly, Appellants are absolutely prohibited from transforming the Trust from religious to secular, from administering the
Trust according to secular principles, or from interpreting and applying the "just wants
and needs" of Trust beneficiaries as defined by the FLDS doctrine of consecration and
stewardship, regardless of the justifications they offer or whether Appellee or anyone else
objected at what Appellants deemed to be the appropriate time.
In sum, Appellants' exercise of jurisdiction and control over the Trust constitutes a
continuing nonwaivable and nonjustifiable violation of the absolute structural limits imDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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posed by the Establishment Clause. The laches determination in Lindberg, therefore,
cannot be viewed as a decision on the merits, because on the merits the underlying structural claims were not subject to that defense. The only reasonable reading of Lindberg is
that the defense of laches prevented Appellee from accessing relief by extraordinary writ,
not that it precluded Appellee from asserting its structural violation claims in all other forums.
CONCLUSION

Utah has a well-developed and robust body of law for the Tenth Circuit to apply to
the determination whether Lindberg has preclusive effect in the courts of Utah, which in
turn is one part of the federal preclusion analysis. Accordingly, Appellee respectfully
submits that the proper answer to the certified question is that the preclusive effect of
dismissal of an extraordinary writ petition on laches grounds depends upon the express
language used, the nature of the case, and the circumstances of the denial. The determination does not turn upon the presence of a written opinion.
DATED this ffiOdav of April, 2012.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Rodney R^Parker
Attorneys for Appellee
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FISHER; DEAN JOSEPH BARLOW;
WALTER SCOTT FISCHER; RICHARD
GILBERT; BRENT JEFFS,
Intervenors.
FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
SAINTS, an Association of Individuals,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

11-4059

v.
BRUCE R. WISAN, Special Fiduciary of
the United Effort Plan Trust; MARK L.
SHURTLEFF, Attorney General for the
State of Utah; THOMAS C. HORNE,
Attorney General for the State of Arizona;

(D. C. No. 2:08-CV-00772-DB)
(D. Utah)
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DENISE POSSE LINDBERG, Judge of
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah,

{

Defendants,
and

i

RICHARD JESSOP REAM; THOMAS
SAMUEL STEED; DON RONALD
FISCHER; DEAN JOSEPH BARLOW;
WALTER SCOTT FISCHER; RICHARD
GILBERT; BRENT JEFFS,

<

Intervenors-Appellants.
d

FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
SAINTS, an Association of Individuals,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

'

v.

11-4066

DENISE POSSE LINDBERG, Judge of
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah,

(D. C. No. 2:08-CV-00772-DB)
(D.Utah)

(

Defendant-Appellant,
and

(

BRUCE R. WISAN, Special Fiduciary of
the United Effort Plan Trust; MARK L.
SHURTLEFF, Attorney General for the
State of Utah; THOMAS C. HORNE,
Attorney General for the State of Arizona,

i

Defendants,
and
4
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RICHARD JESSOP REAM; THOMAS
SAMUEL STEED; DON RONALD
FISCHER; DEAN JOSEPH BARLOW;
WALTER SCOTT FISCHER; RICHARD
GILBERT; BRENT JEFFS,
Intervenors,
and
JONATHAN HARKER, HYRUM
HARKER; HARKER DAIRY FARM,
Movants.

FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
SAINTS, an Association of Individuals,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

11-4071

THOMAS C. HORNE, Attorney General
for the State of Arizona,

(D. C. No. 2:08-CV-00772-DB)
(D. Utah)

Defendant-Appellant,
and
BRUCE R. WISAN, Special Fiduciary of
the United Effort Plan Trust; MARK L.
SHURTLEFF, Attorney General for the
State of Utah; DENISE POSSE
LINDBERG, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah,
Defendants,
5
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i

and
t

RICHARD JESSOP REAM; THOMAS
SAMUEL STEED, DON RONALD
FISCHER; DEAN JOSEPH BARLOW;
WALTER SCOTT FISCHER; RICHARD
GILBERT; BRENT JEFFS,

i

Intervenors,
and
HARKER DAIRY FARM; JONATHAN
HARKER,
Movants.
FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
SAINTS, an Association of Individuals,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

11-4072

BRUCE R. WISAN, Special Fiduciary of
the United Effort Plan Trust; MARK L.
SHURTLEFF, Attorney General for the
State of Utah; THOMAS C. HORNE,
Attorney General for the State of Arizona;
DENISE POSSE LINDBERG, Judge of |
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah,

(D. C. No. 2:08-CV-00772-DB)
(D. Utah)

Defendants,
and
RICHARD JESSOP REAM; THOMAS
SAMUEL STEED; DON RONALD
FISCHER; DEAN JOSEPH BARLOW;

|
6
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WALTER SCOTT FISCHER; RICHARD
GILBERT; BRENT JEFFS,
Intervenors-Appellants.
FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
SAINTS, an Association of Individuals,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

11-4076
(D. C. No. 2:08-CV-00772-DB)
(D. Utah)

BRUCE R. WISAN, Special Fiduciary of
the United Effort Plan Trust,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, Attorney
General for the State of Utah; THOMAS
C. HORNE, Attorney General for the
State of Arizona; DENISE POSSE
LINDBERG, Judge of the Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah,
Defendants,
and
RICHARD JESSOP REAM; THOMAS
SAMUEL STEED; DON RONALD
FISCHER; DEAN JOSEPH BARLOW;
WALTER SCOTT FISCHER; RICHARD
GILBERT; BRENT JEFFS,
Intervenors.
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i
ORDER CERTIFYING STATE LAW QUESTIONS
(

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, BALDOCK and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
(

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, pursuant to Tenth
Circuit Rule 27.1 and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, requests that the Utah

(

Supreme Court exercise its discretion and accept the following important certified
question of Utah law:
Under Utah preclusion law, is the Utah Supreme Court's
discretionary review of a petition for extraordinary writ and
subsequent dismissal on laches grounds a decision "on the
merits" when it is accompanied by a written opinion, such
that later adjudication of the same claim is barred?

{

The resolution of this question of Utah law will likely control the outcome in
appeals pending before our court. There does not appear to be any controlling Utah law
addressing this issue. The background relevant to a determination of the certified
question is set forth below.

8
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I.
This case concerns a Utah probate court's reformation of a religious charitable
trust—the United Effort Plan Trust ("UEP Trust")—and its ongoing involvement in the
administration of that trust. In October 2008, plaintiff-appellee Fundamentalist Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints1 ("FLDS Association") filed a complaint in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
The complaint named as defendants the attorneys general of Utah and Arizona, Utah
District Judge Denise Posse Lindberg, and Bruce R. Wisan, the court-appointed special
fiduciary. The complaint included six claims for relief, including: (1) a claim for
declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deprivation of the FLDS Association's
rights under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the United States
Constitution; (2) a claim for declaratory relief under Art. 1, §§ 1 and 4 of the Utah
Constitution; (3) a claim for violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.: (4) a claim that Utah Code Ann. §
76-7-101, which prohibits plural marriage, is unconstitutional as applied under the United
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution; (5) a claim that Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-71001,-412(1), and -412(l)(c) are unconstitutional as applied; and (6) a claim for

1

The church itself is not a party to this case. Plaintiff-appellee refers to itself as
"The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, an Association of
Individuals" ("FLDS Association"). According to the district court's assessment, the
FLDS Association includes some 5,000 people. As an association of individual church
members or adherents, the FLDS Association does not represent the church itself or the
Corporation of the President (COP), a separate legal entity.
9
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(

injunctive relief against the defendants' "continuing administration" of the UEP Trust.
{

The FLDS Association later moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction against the probate court's ongoing administration of the UEP Trust.
In October 2009, while the federal case was pending, the FLDS Association filed a

i

petition for extraordinary writ in the Utah Supreme Court. The petition challenged Judge
Lindberg's reformation of the UEP Trust on substantially similar grounds as the federal
I

complaint. The Utah Supreme Court dismissed the petition in a written opinion. The
court observed that because "parties who file petitions for extraordinary writ under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 65B have no right to receive a remedy that corrects a lower
court's mishandling of a particular case,... extraordinary relief under rule 65B(d)(2) is
completely" discretionary. Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
i

Lindberg. 238 P.3d 1054, 1061-62 (Utah 2010) (footnote and internal quotation marks
omitted). Citing the equitable doctrine of laches, the court observed that the FLDS
Association "was not diligent in challenging the [state] district court's modification of the
UEP Trust, and that lack of diligence has resulted in prejudice to numerous parties." IcL
at 1066.
After the Utah Supreme Court issued its decision Lindbergh the federal district
court took up the FLDS Association's pending motion for a preliminary injunction. The
court recognized that the constitutional claims raised in Lindberg were similar to those
raised in the federal complaint. The court ordered supplemental briefing on the res
judicata effect of Lindberg. In its February 24, 2011, memorandum opinion and order
10
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granting the FLDS Association a preliminary injunction, the district court determined that
"the Utah Supreme Court's finding of laches [in Lindberg] was not a judgment on the
merits for res judicata purposes." Memorandum Opinion and Order at 37, Fundamentalist
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Wisan. No. 2:08-cv-00772-DB (D. Utah
Feb. 24, 2011). The court acknowledged that both parties "agree that the law of the state
of Utah on this point is not settled" because "there is no clear precedent from the Utah
Supreme Court or any other Utah state court regarding whether laches always constitutes
a 'judgment on the merits' for res judicata purposes." IcL at 35. Despite this uncertainty,
the court attempted to discern the Utah Supreme Court's likely approach to the question.
It explained that while there are various approaches, "one common element... is whether
the underlying case in which laches was found included a fair examination of the
circumstances and merits of the suit." Id. at 38. In analyzing the Lindberg opinion, the
court concluded that the Utah Supreme Court did not undertake an "assessment of any
kind whatsoever as to whether the [FLDS Association's] claims of serious constitutional
violations had any merit at all." IcL at 41. "As a result," the court reasoned, "the
plaintiffs have not yet had a forum in which their claims of serious constitutional
violations have been entertained or addressed sufficiently to earn a finding that they were
on the merits." Id After concluding that Lindberg should not have preclusive effect, the
court went on to grant the FLDS Association's motion for preliminary injunction because
"the method the [defendants] chose to utilize in dealing with the Trust" likely violated the
Constitution and supported preliminary injunctive relief. IdL at 47.
11
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II.
We state at the outset that "[certification by this court in no way implies an abuse
of discretion by the district court in failing to certify, but only indicates our independent
judgment on the question." Pino v. United States. 507 F.3d 1233, 1235 (10th Cir. 2007).

(

We have previously said that we must "seek to give meaning and respect to the federal
character of our judicial system, recognizing that the judicial policy of a state should be
decided when possible by state, not federal, courts." IdL at 1236. Undertaking de novo
review of the question, see Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Reinhart 402 R3d 982, 1001-02 (10th
Cir. 2005), we conclude that the Utah Supreme Court is the proper venue for this novel

i

and unsettled question of Utah law.
The unsettled nature of this issue of Utah preclusion law is apparent to all parties
involved in these complicated cases. While some have assured us that there is "a
reasonably clear and principled course" for us to follow, see Pino. 507 F.3d at 1236, we
have no trouble concluding that the preclusive effect of the Utah Supreme Court's
dismissal of a petition for extraordinary writ on laches grounds is far from certain under
Utah law. It is clear that a court's denial of a petition for extraordinary writ without
written opinion is generally not a decision "on the merits" for purposes of res judicata.
See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County. 575 P.2d 705, 708 (Utah 1978). And a
party is barred by res judicata from seeking a petition for extraordinary writ in the Utah
Supreme Court after such writ is denied by the Utah Court of Appeals in a written order.
See Gates v. Taylor, 997 P.2d 903, 903 (Utah 2000) (per curiam) ("[W]hen a court of
12
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competent jurisdiction has adjudicated directly upon a particular matter, the same point is
not open to inquiry in a subsequent action for the same cause and between the same
parties.") (quoting Cohn v. Isensee. 188 P. 278 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920)). But the Utah
courts have never squarely decided whether a dismissal of a petition for extraordinary
writ on laches grounds bars subsequent litigation of the same claim, or related claims, in a
different court.
Courts in other states have reached different conclusions on this issue. Compare
Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 5 P.3d 874, 884 (Cal. 2000) ("The defense of laches has
nothing to do with the merits of the cause against which it is asserted. . . . The telling
consideration must be that laches constitutes an affirmative defense which does not reach
the merits of the cause . . . . " (citation omitted)); with Day v. Wiswall's Estate. 381 P.2d
217, 220 (Ariz. 1963) ("Unlike the statute of limitations, the doctrine of laches is properly
applied only after a consideration of the circumstances and merits of a suit. . . . The
judgment in the [prior] suit was not one of dismissal, but, after a full hearing and
consideration of evidence and a finding of laches as a fact, was that the plaintiff take
nothing by reason of the actions. It was therefore a judgment on the merits." (citations
omitted)).
While a court's dismissal of a petition for extraordinary writ may amount to an
adjudication "on the merits," a court may also deny relief on discretionary grounds or on
the basis of "limitations inherent in the extraordinary nature of the writ." Hiley v. United
States, 807 F.2d 623, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Where, as here, the denial of the petition is
13
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based not on the merits of the dispute, but rather on the limitations inherent in the
extraordinary naiture of the writ, such a denial does not preclude examination of the merits
of the questions presented in the mandamus petition under the doctrine[] of res judicata . .
.."); see also FOCUS v. Allegheny Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 842 (3d Cir.
1996) ("Where the extraordinary jurisdiction of a court is unsuccessfully invoked and the
court does not expressly adjudicate the tendered merits issue, the general rule is that there
is no preclusive effect and the petitioning party is free subsequently to pursue his claim in
any appropriate forum."); 18A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure §
4445 (2d ed. 2002) ("Denial of a writ commonly rests on severe limitations of jurisdiction
and discretion that prevent the court from applying ordinary tests of reversible error. If a
decision is confined by these limitations, it should not preclude examination of the merits
in later proceedings. Preclusion is appropriate only if denial rested on the merits of the
questions presented rather than remedial limitations." (footnotes omitted)). If a party is
barred by laches from obtaining discretionary and extraordinary relief, does it necessarily
follow that laches would apply of the same force to a claim invoking a court's mandatory
jurisdiction? Because the proper course in Utah is not well marked, we will defer to the
Utah Supreme Court's determination of the preclusive effect of its own decisions.
III.
Accordingly, under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, we hereby certify this
question of state law to the Utah Supreme Court. The Clerk of this court shall transmit a
copy of this certification order to counsel for all parties. The Clerk shall also forward,
14
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

appellate uase: n-4U4y

uocument: uiui«»U39b9

Date Filed: 03/02/2012

Page: 15

under the Tenth Circuit's official seal, a copy of this certification order and the briefs
filed in this court to the Utah Supreme Court. These appeals are ABATED pending
resolution of the certified question.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
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This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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August 27, 2010

Original Proceeding in this Court
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DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
11
This case concerns the United Effort Plan Trust ("UEP
Trust" or "Trust")—a trust originally formed in 1942 by what
petitioners characterize as a fundamentalist religious group that
was the predecessor of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints. The Trust was modified in 1998 so that it
qualified as a charitable trust under Utah law. In 2006, the
Utah Third District Court issued an order that modified the Trust
again. This order was not appealed or otherwise challenged for
nearly three years. In a petition for extraordinary writ, an
association of members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the "FLDS Association")1 challenges
the district court's modification and subsequent administration
of this Trust as unconstitutional and in violation of Utah law.
We hold that because the FLDS Association has delayed this
challenge for nearly three years, and because during this time,
many parties have engaged in numerous transactions in reliance on
the Trust's modification, the FLDS Association's trust
modification claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of
laches. We also hold that all of the FLDS Association's
remaining claims regarding trust administration, except one, are
also barred by laches because they involve the same delay and
prejudice as the modification claim. The claim that is not
barred by laches is barred because it is not ripe for
adjudication.
BACKGROUND
12
In. 1942, the spiritual leadership of a fundamentalist
religious movement called the "Priesthood Work" formed the United
Effort Plan Trust. The UEP Trust stated that its purpose was
"charitable and philanthropic," but conditioned membership in the
Trust upon "consecration" of real and mixed property to the
Trust. For this fundamentalist group—predecessors of the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (the
"FLDS Church" or "Church")—consecration was an act of faith
whereby members deeded their property to the UEP Trust to be
managed by Church leaders. Church leaders, who were also

1

The FLDS
Church, nor the
the association
Jesus Christ of
individuals."

No. 20090859

Association currently petitioning is not the FLDS
corporation of that church's president. Rather,
describes itself as "The Fundamentalist Church of
Latter-Day Saints, an association of
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trustees, then used this property to minister to the needs of the
members.
513
In 1 9 8 6 , some T r u s t p r o p e r t y r e s i d e n t s sued the UEP
t r u s t e e s for b r e a c h of f i d u c i a r y d u t y .
T h e d i s t r i c t court
r e j e c t e d t h o s e c l a i m s , f i n d i n g that s i n c e the UEP Trust w a s
c h a r i t a b l e r a t h e r t h a n p r i v a t e , the p l a i n t i f f s l a c k e d s t a n d i n g to
sue.
In 1 9 9 8 , we r e v e r s e d the d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s h o l d i n g that the
Trust was charitable.2
W e first n o t e d that c h a r i t a b l e t r u s t s
d i f f e r from p r i v a t e t r u s t s b e c a u s e " A i n a p r i v a t e t r u s t [ , ]
p r o p e r t y is d e v o t e d to t h e use of s p e c i f i e d p e r s o n s w h o are
d e s i g n a t e d as b e n e f i c i a r i e s of the t r u s t ; w h e r e a s a c h a r i t a b l e
trust h a s as a b e n e f i c i a r y a d e f i n i t e c l a s s and i n d e f i n i t e
b e n e f i c i a r i e s w i t h i n t h e d e f i n i t e c l a s s , and the p u r p o s e is
b e n e f i c i a l to the c o m m u n i t y . ' " 3
We t h e n found that the U E P Trust
w a s not a c h a r i t a b l e t r u s t b e c a u s e it w a s i n t e n d e d , from its
i n c e p t i o n , to b e n e f i t s p e c i f i e d p e r s o n s , n a m e l y the T r u s t ' s
founders.4

514
In response to our decision, Rulon Jeffs, the sole
surviving founder and beneficiary of the 1942 Trust, acting for
himself and also in his capacity as president and Corporation
Sole of the FLDS Church, along with the other trustees, executed
the "Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust of the United
Effort Plan" (the "1998 Restatement"). It is not disputed that
the 1998 Restatement of the 1942 UEP Trust qualifies as a
charitable trust. It broadened the class of beneficiaries beyond
the founders of the Trust to all of those who "consecrate their
lives, time[], talents, and resources to the building and
establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth under the direction
of the President of the [FLDS] church." The 1998 Restatement
provided that "in the event of termination of this Trust, whether
by the Board of Trustees or by reason of law, the assets of the
Trust Estate at that time shall become the property of the
Corporation of the President of the [FLDS Church]."
15
In 2004, then-FLDS Church president, Warren Jeffs, the
Trust, and the FLDS Church were sued in two separate tort
actions: the first action alleged child sexual abuse, assault,
and fraud primarily against Warren Jeffs; the second alleged
2

Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Utah 1998).

3

Id. at 1252 (emphasis added) (quoting Olivas v. Bd. of
Nat'l Missions of Presbyterian Church, 405 P.2d 481, 485 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1965)).
4

Id. at 1252-53.

3 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

No. 20090859

\

civil conspiracy, fraud, breach of fiduciary duties, and other
torts against Warren Jeffs, the FLDS Church, and the Trust.
Rodney Parker of the law firm of Snow, Christensen & Martineau
served as attorney for the Trust and the FLDS Church in these
actions until he withdrew because his clients insisted upon a
course of conduct with which he fundamentally disagreed, and
because his clients had discharged him. Warren Jeffs, as
controlling trustee, did not appoint a substitute attorney to
defend the Trust in the litigation, leaving the Trust vulnerable
to default judgments against it.
56
With this concern in mind, Mr. Parker filed motions in
the district court asking the court to give notice to the Utah
Attorney General ("Utah AG") and the Trust land residents before
entering a default judgment against the Trust. In response, the
Utah AG petitioned the district court for (1) removal of the
trustees for breach of fiduciary duty; (2) an order compelling
Warren Jeffs and the other trustees to appear and file an
inventory, final report, and accounting of the administration of
the Trust; and (3) appointment of a special fiduciary to serve
until new trustees were appointed. The Utah AG's petition was
filed in May 2005. Personal service was made on those trustees
who could be found. Trustees who could not be served personally
were served via substitute service. Publications were made where
Trust participants resided.
57
In a June 2005 preliminary injunction, the district
court suspended the trustees and appointed a special fiduciary
for the Trust. The special fiduciary's powers and authority were
outlined in various district court orders. The district court
gave the special fiduciary authority to act on behalf of the
Trust. The district court also ordered the suspended trustees to
prepare an accounting, deliver records, and cooperate with the
fiduciary, but the suspended trustees failed to comply with this
order. The district court asked the special fiduciary to prepare
a memorandum identifying issues the court needed to address
before appointing new trustees. Ultimately, the special
fiduciary expressed concern in a memorandum filed with the
district court that the Trust needed to be reformed if new
trustees were to be appointed.
58
On December 13, 2005, the district court entered an
order that concluded the Trust could be reformed so that the
special fiduciary could administer the Trust to meet the "just
wants and needs" of the beneficiaries according to neutral,
nonreligious principles. The district court cited Utah Code
section 75-7-413 as its authority to use the doctrine of cy pres
to modify the Trust. Cy pres is a common-law doctrine, now
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adopted by statute in Utah Code section 75-7-413, that courts may
apply when a charitable purpose of a trust "becomes unlawful,
impracticable, impossible to achieve, or wasteful."5 Rather than
allowing the Trust to fail in these situations, under the common
law, courts would apply the trust "'to other charitable objects
lawful in their character, but corresponding, as near as may be
to the original intention of the [settlor]. '"6 The Utah Code's
similar language allows a court faced with a trust whose purpose
has become "unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve, or
wasteful . . . to modify or terminate the trust by directing that
the trust property be applied or distributed . . . in a manner
consistent with the settlor's charitable purposes."7
59
The district court listed two reasons for using cy pres
to reform the Trust. First, the court found that the trustees
had breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudent trust
administration. Second, it found several Trust provisions to be
"fundamentally flawed and unworkable."
510 The following three principles guided the district
court's reformation of the Trust: First, the court would attempt
to preserve the Trust's charitable intent. Second, the court
would only give effect to the Trust's legitimate and legal
purposes. Finally, the court would employ "neutral principles of
law."
Ill To meet its first goal of preserving the Trust's
charitable intent, the district court had to first identify that
intent. It characterized the 1998 Restatement as having at least
two purposes: first, the Trust was to advance the religious
doctrines and goals of the FLDS Church; and second, the Trust was
to provide for the just wants and needs of the FLDS Church
members. The FLDS Association characterizes each of these goals
as religious because participation in the Trust was conditioned
upon living according to Church principles, with the president of
the FLDS Church being the ultimate arbiter of individual
righteousness.

5

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-413(1) (Supp. 2010); see also In re
Gerber, 652 P.2d 937, 939-40 & n.4 (Utah 1982) (explaining the
history of the common-law cy pres doctrine).
6

Gerber, 652 P.2d at 939 (quoting Late Corp. of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Dav Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 56 (1890)).
7

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-413(1)(c).
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512 Using the second of its principles—to give effect only
to the Trust's legitimate and legal purposes—the district court
held that it could reform the Trust by excising the purpose of
advancing the religious doctrines and goals of the FLDS Church to
the degree that any of these were illegal. As examples of
illegal doctrines it could not sanction, the district court
listed "polygamy, bigamy, [and] sexual activity between adults
and minors." The court instead focused its reformation on
preserving the Trust's goal of providing for the just wants and
needs of Trust participants, which it held was a "lawful
religious purpose[]."
3113 Despite finding a "lawful religious purpose," the third
of the district court's principles mandated that the court reform
the Trust using "neutral principles." The court understood this
to mean that it could not resolve property disputes on the basis
of religious doctrine. The district court's memorandum decision
states,
[C]ourts are prohibited by the First
Amendment from resolving "rights to the use
and control of church property on the basis
of a judicial determination that one group of
claimants has adhered faithfully to the
fundamental faiths, doctrines and practices
of the church . . . while the other group of
claimants has departed substantially
therefrom." In short, courts must separate
that which is primarily ecclesiastical from
that which is primarily secular, and must
defer to ecclesiastical authority for
ecclesiastical determinations.
But the district court felt that if FLDS ecclesiastical leaders
were able to make ecclesiastical determinations about who
participated in the Trust, many former or disaffected members of
the FLDS Church who consecrated property to the Trust "could be
excluded from consideration notwithstanding their prior
consecrations to the Trust." The district court found this
unacceptable. It resolved that the Trust needed to be modified
so that the role of ecclesiastical leaders would be to provide
"non-binding input" to future trustees. These trustees would
then use a neutral set of criteria and their own "good judgment"-informed but not bound by FLDS ecclesiastical advice—to
determine the "just wants and needs" of the beneficiaries.
514 Ultimately, the district court concluded that
implementation of these principles would require modifying each
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section of the Trust. These modifications included the
following: stating that Trust property would only be used in
furtherance of "legitimate Trust purposes" as identified by the
court; allowing FLDS leaders to offer their nonbinding input, but
granting the Board of Trustees the ultimate authority to
determine who would be allowed to live on Trust property and what
the Trust property residents' just wants and needs were; limiting
the Board's power to order relocation or property sharing among
Trust property residents to situations where the relocation
arrangement was "necessary for legitimate Trust administration
reasons"; and deleting or modifying the Trust's requirement that
occupants of Trust land live according to Church doctrine. The
goal of the district court was unambiguous: "A clear division
must exist between the authority of the Board to act with respect
to the Trust, and the authority of the priesthood to act with
respect to the [FLDS Church] Plan."
515 The district court decided that the Trust's third
section would also need to be modified to strip the FLDS Church
president of several powers under the Trust. First, the district
court would remove any requirement that the president of the FLDS
Church approve any Board action. Since the 1998 Restatement gave
the FLDS Church president power to appoint and remove trustees,
the district court invited interested parties to suggest Trust
modifications that would allow for a different method of
appointing and removing trustees. Second, the district court
modified the Trust to remove the president of the Church as
trustee and as president of the Board of Trustees. The court
felt this modification was necessary because it had just
suspended Warren Jeffs, the FLDS president, as a trustee and
because it wanted to keep the Church and the Church Plan separate
from the Trust. Finally, the district court found that a
reversionary clause that would cause the Trust to revert to the
FLDS president in the event of termination needed to be altered
because the court had just suspended the FLDS president's
trusteeship for violation of his fiduciary duties to Trust
beneficiaries, and because, in the event of reversion, the Trust
assets might be used to further illegal FLDS practices.
SI16 In its order, the district court invited suggestions
for reformation of the 1998 Restatement. It also formed an
advisory board to aid the special fiduciary in administration of
the Trust until trustees could be appointed. It was understood
that the court would consider the members of the advisory board
as candidates to become trustees. There were no active FLDS
members on the advisory board. On October 25, 2006, the court
entered an order reforming the Trust (the "2006 Reformed Trust").
This order was not appealed.

7
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117 The 2006 Reformed Trust contains over 175 paragraphs
compared to seventeen in the 1998 Restatement. The FLDS
Association complains that those who had sued the UEP Trust took
the "laboring oar" in drafting the 2006 Reformed Trust, and that
their goal was to transform the FLDS culture and to liberate a
people they felt belonged to a dangerous cult. The FLDS
Association also complains that the religious mission and purpose
of the Trust have been removed—that what was "fundamentally a
religious institution guided by divine inspiration" is now its
"wholly secular mirror image." The FLDS Association feels that
the 2006 Reformation suppresses the FLDS Church's role "as the
spiritual and economic center of life in the communit[y]."
SI18 The district court has retained jurisdiction over the
administration of the Trust. It has instituted a process that
allows Trust participants to petition to have the houses they
live in distributed to them. The district court has expressed in
a hearing that FLDS Church members are free to deed their houses
over to any religious leader of their choice following
distribution. Over the four-and-a-half years of the special
fiduciary's administration, he has filed numerous reports with
the district court. Some of the challenges the special fiduciary
has faced in administering the Trust include the fact that Trust
property has not been subdivided and multiple residents often
live on one tax parcel. These conditions have complicated
liquidation and distribution of Trust property. For instance,
because the Trust's real property consists of several large
parcels of land often containing several residences, if one of a
parcel's residents fails to pay taxes, the parcel's other
residents could face tax liens even if they have paid their fair
share. The special fiduciary also complains that the suspended
trustees'" failure to cooperate with him has caused the fiduciary
to expend significant time and effort to obtain information and
records about the Trust and its property and that he has incurred
significant costs and expense in discovering this information.
He further asserts that the suspended trustees have actively
interfered with his administration of the Trust.
119 But the FLDS Association, in turn, alleges that the
district court and special fiduciary have engaged in religiously
discriminatory behavior. The FLDS Association alleges that the
special fiduciary has made numerous offensive and religiously
discriminatory remarks, including characterizing FLDS Church
leaders' determination of "just wants and needs" pursuant to
scripture and revelation as the "whim of leadership," and
"discriminating on the basis of religion"; referring to himself
as the "State-Ordained Bishop" or "SOB" as a way of mocking the
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FLDS faith; and describing the process of Trust administration as
a "sociological and psychological war" with the FLDS Association.
The FLDS Association also alleges that, despite claims to the
contrary and due to a fear of creating a "UEP II," the district
court and the special fiduciary plan to implement a religious
test to distribute Trust assets that would award outright deeds
to non-FLDS Trust participants, but would impose a spendthrift
trust on any Trust participant likely to donate Trust
distributions to the FLDS Church.
520 On October 20, 2009, the FLDS Association brought these
allegations to this court in a petition for extraordinary writ,
filed under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B. The petition asks
this court to do the following: find that the district court's
actions have violated FLDS Church members' First Amendment rights
and their rights under Utah's constitution, declare that certain
sections of Utah's Uniform Trust Code are unconstitutional as
applied to the FLDS Association, enjoin the district court from
taking further action in the underlying UEP Trust litigation,
declare the district court's reformation of the Trust
unconstitutional, terminate the reformed Trust, overturn the
district court's authorization to sell certain Trust property
deemed sacred by the FLDS Association, terminate the appointment
of the special fiduciary, and provide any other appropriate
relief. Willie Jessop, a representative of the FLDS Association
and a member of the FLDS Church, filed an affidavit with this
petition outlining FLDS religious beliefs and what are in his
view intrusions by the district court and the special fiduciary
into Mr. Jessop's practice of these beliefs. The FLDS
Association has also filed a substantially similar lawsuit along
with a substantially similar affidavit by Willie Jessop in
federal district court.
5121 The original interested individuals who sued the Trust
in 2004 (the "Original Interested Individuals"), the Utah AG, the
Arizona Attorney General (the "Arizona A G " ) , and the UEP Trust
through the special fiduciary all filed oppositions to the FLDS
Association's Petition for Extraordinary Writ. Among other
things, they have alleged that the FLDS Association lacks
standing, that it has other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies
available, and that laches bar the FLDS Association's claims.
5122 The FLDS Association then filed a rule 8A petition with
this court for emergency relief. This petition centered around
three separate actions taken by the district court and the
special fiduciary.
First, the district court had allowed the
special fiduciary to begin seeking buyers for certain Trust
property the FLDS Association claimed was sacred. Second, the
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special fiduciary had sold some of the Trust's dairy cows subject
to a right to repurchase that was set to expire. Third, the
district court had entered an order that asked the Utah AG and
the special fiduciary to submit suggestions under seal regarding
how the Trust could be administered in such a way that might
avoid the kind of extensive litigation that continued to ensue.
The FLDS Association's petition asked us to stop the sale of the
Trust property they deemed sacred, extend the time for repurchase
of the dairy cows, and reverse the district court's order that
sealed the submissions by the Utah AG and the special fiduciary.
The petition for emergency relief drew responses from the special
fiduciary on behalf of the UEP Trust, Harker Dairy (the purchaser
of the cows), the "Twin Cities" (Hilldale and Colorado City), and
the Arizona AG. We denied the FLDS Association's Petition for
Emergency Relief.8
SI23 We now address the FLDS Association's rule 65B Petition
for Extraordinary Writ. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code section 78A-3-102(2) (Supp. 2010).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
^24 The FLDS Association bases its petition on rule 65B,
which states that, so long as "no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy is available, . . . relief may be granted . . .
where an inferior court . . . has exceeded its jurisdiction or

8

The FLDS Association's petitions and the responses thereto
have spawned additional litigation. The Utah AG has moved to
strike the response of the Twin Cities, which we granted to the
degree that the Twin Cities brought new claims, and otherwise
deferred. The Utah AG also moved to strike a supplement that
added Lyle Jeffs and Willie Jessop as named petitioners in this
action. We have deferred this motion. The FLDS Association has
moved to strike exhibits and related arguments in the Utah AG's
and special fiduciary's responses. We have deferred this motion.
The Original Interested Individuals have moved to transmit the
record of proceedings below. The FLDS Association has opposed
this motion, and we have deferred it. Because of our resolution
in this case, we find it unnecessary to rule on any of these
deferred motions. Additionally, on August 19, 2010, the FLDS
Association filed a Petition for Emergency Relief asking this
court to enjoin the Third District Court from administering the
UEP Trust until we render our decision in this case. The Utah
AG, the Ari2:ona AG, and the UEP Trust through the Special
Fiduciary opposed this petition. The issuance of this opinion
renders ruling on that petition unnecessary.
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abused its discretion."9 Specifically, the FLDS Association
alleges that the district court "committed an unprecedented abuse
of discretion" when it reformed the UEP Trust. But parties who
file petitions for extraordinary writ under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 65B have " x no right to receive a remedy that corrects a
lower court's mishandling of a particular case/" 1 0 So even if
the FLDS Association shows that the district court abused its
discretion, extraordinary "[rjelief under rule 65B(d)(2) is
completely at the discretion of [this court]." 11 Several factors
inform our discretion to grant extraordinary relief, including
the " 'egregiousness of the alleged error, the significance of the
legal issue presented by the petition, the severity of the
consequences occasioned by the alleged error,' and any additional
factors that may be regarded as important to the case's
outcome."12 While "there is no fixed limitation period governing
the time for filing [extraordinary writs]," they "should be filed
within a reasonable time after the act complained of has been
done or refused," and "the equitable doctrine of laches is
available to dismiss untimely writs."13
ANALYSIS
SI25 The FLDS Association's claims fall into two broad
categories: first, that the district court's modification of the
UEP Trust violated Utah law and the FLDS Association's members'
constitutional rights; and second, that during the district
court's ongoing administration of the Trust, the district court
and the special fiduciary have engaged in conduct that also
violates the FLDS Association's members' constitutional rights.
In Part I, we hold that the FLDS Association's claims regarding
the district court's modification of the Trust are barred by the
equitable doctrine of laches. In Part II, we hold that all of
the FLDS Association's remaining claims regarding the Trust's
administration, except one, are also barred by laches. The claim
that is not barred by laches is not ripe for our consideration.

9

Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a), (d)(2) (emphasis added).

10

State v. Lavcock, 2009 UT 53, 1 7, 214 P.3d 104 (quoting
State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 1 23, 127 P.3d 682).
11

Id^. 5 8.

12

IcL 1 9 (quoting Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 1 24).

13

Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 684
(Utah 1995).
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I. THE FLDS ASSOCIATION'S CLAIMS REGARDING TRUST MODIFICATION
ARE BARRED BY LACHES BECAUSE OF THE FLDS ASSOCIATION'S DELAY IN
FILING THE CLAIMS AND THE PREJUDICE THAT HAS RESULTED
SI26 Because the FLDS Association has waited nearly three
years from the date the district court modified the UEP Trust to
challenge its modification and, in the interim, transactions have
occurred and other parties have acted in reliance on the Trust's
modification, the FLDS Association's claims are barred by the
equitable doctrine of laches. The FLDS Association asserts that
the district court modified the Trust in violation of Utah law
and the federal and state constitutions, and that the continued
administration of the Trust violates their constitutional rights.
Despite the potential merit of these claims, the district court's
order was never appealed, and the FLDS Association has waited
nearly three years from the date of the Trust's modification to
bring its case to this court. During this time, countless
transactions have taken place in reliance on the Trust's
modification. Accordingly, we dismiss these claims pursuant to
the doctrine of laches.
121 There is no statute of limitations for bringing a rule
65B claim, but such claims "should be filed within a reasonable
time after the act complained of has been done or refused."14
And although laches is most often thought of as an affirmative
defense to untimely claims brought by a plaintiff, we have held
that "the equitable doctrine of laches is available to dismiss
untimely writs."15 We have called laches "Melay that works a
disadvantage to another.'"16 So, laches has two elements: (1) a
party's lack of diligence and (2) an injury resulting from that
lack of diligence.17
TL28
The length of time that constitutes a lack of diligence
"depend[s] on the circumstances of each case," because "the
propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon the
gravity of the prejudice suffered . . . and the length of [the]

14

Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 684
(Utah 1995).
15

Id.

16

Anqelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah
1983) (quoting Papanikolas Bros. Enters, v. Suqarhouse Shopping
Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975)).
17

Id.
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delay.//18 In determining whether to apply the doctrine of
laches, we consider the relative harm caused by the petitioner's
delay, the relative harm to the petitioner, and whether or not
the respondent acted in good faith.19 Further, "reasonable delay
caused by an effort to settle a dispute does not invoke the
doctrine of laches."20
SI29 In our 1975 case, Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v.
Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates, we thoroughly explored the
way Utah courts apply the doctrine of laches. There we held that
a district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the
plaintiffs' claims were not barred by laches.21 In that case,
the defendants built a structure that encroached on a parking
easement owned by the plaintiffs.22 When the plaintiffs noticed
the defendants building the structure, they promptly contacted
the defendants to object.23 The parties' lawyers exchanged
letters, and significantly, over the next few months, the
defendants attempted to negotiate a purchase of the plaintiffs'
interest.24 Eighteen months after first noticing the building of
the structure, the plaintiffs sued to enforce the restrictive
covenant that created the easement.25 The defendants urged
laches as a bar to enforcement.26 We held that there was "not
the same imminent necessity for early enforcement of demands" as
might have existed before the conditions became fixed because the
defendants had "openly defie[d] [the plaintiffs'] known rights,"
without any indication of "assent or abandonment of intent to
oppose on the part of [the plaintiffs]," and because the

18

Papanikolas Bros., 535 P.2d at 1260.

19

See id.

20

IdL.

21

Ick at 1261.

22

Id,. at 1258, 1260.

23

Ick at 1260.

24

Id^.

25

Id^

26

Id.
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plaintiffs' delay caused "no substantial harm" to the
defendants .27
(

SI30 The facts of the case now before us could not be more
starkly different. The district court finalized its modification
of the UEP Trust in October 2006 after nearly a year of
discussion and an invitation to interested parties to make
suggestions for modification.28 The order reforming the Trust
was never appealed. The FLDS Association filed this petition
over four years after the Utah AG had intervened, over four years
after the special fiduciary had been appointed, and nearly three
years after the district court had modified the Trust. This
amounts to at least twice the length of time that the plaintiffs
in Papanikolas Bros, waited. The FLDS Association's brief does
not explain why the Association waited so long to challenge the
Trust's reformation. But the FLDS Association's numerous
complaints about the special fiduciary's administration of the
Trust make clear it was not because the Association was unaware
of the modification. Although the opposition briefs cite the
FLDS Association's delay as a reason for this court to dismiss
the petition, the FLDS Association does not respond with
explanations as to why this delay is reasonable. Where in
Papanikolas Bros, it was clear that the plaintiffs' negotiations
with the defendants might have given them reason to delay
litigation, here there were no discussions held with the district
court until November 2008—nearly two years after the Trust had
been modified and over three years after the litigation b e g a n —
despite assurances by the court that participation was welcome.
This delayed first contact with the district court spawned
negotiations between the interested parties, who agreed to stay
litigation in an effort to avoid the sale of certain Trust
property. But these negotiations do not make the case for
applying the doctrine of laches any less compelling. Unlike the
prompt negotiations in Papanikolas Bros., these discussions came
nearly two years after the act now complained of by the FLDS
Association-—the district court's reformation of the Trust.
Negotiations entered into nearly two years after events that
formed the basis of a complaint do not excuse a nearly three-year
delay in petitioning this court for extraordinary relief.
27

Id. at 1260-61 (internal quotation marks omitted).

28

The district court's memorandum decision stated, "In
accord with the order and timetable discussed at the November 7th
hearing, all. parties in interest are invited to provide the Court
with their specific suggestions for reforming the Trust within
the framework and principles provided by this Memorandum
Decision."
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3131 Additionally, the FLDS Association's silence during the
Trust reformation process and the Trust's subsequent
administration gave the district court every reason to believe
that the reformation had occurred without opposition. Indeed,
while the FLDS Association disagrees with the district court's
application of the law, the court's motive appears to be
protection of the beneficiaries' charitable interests, not
defiance of FLDS Association members' rights under the Trust.
532 Because of the three-year delay in the face of
invitations by the district court to participate, and because
this delay did not occur under circumstances that might excuse
it, such as prompt negotiations aimed at avoiding litigation, or
under circumstances that might make us otherwise hesitant to
apply the doctrine of laches, the FLDS Association has
demonstrated a lack of diligence in filing this petition.
533 This lack of diligence has caused injury to those who
relied on the Trust's modification during the FLDS Association's
delay. The Utah AG aptly describes how the FLDS Association's
delay has worked to the disadvantage of others:
In the meantime, the Special Fiduciary
reasonably relied on the presumptively valid
appointment and reformation orders. He has
made choices over the years, many expressly
approved by Judge Lindberg, that cannot be
undone. He has incurred irrevocable
obligations and expenses for the Trust during
the last four years. Other interested
persons, including Trust Participants who are
not members of the Petitioner association,
have also made irreversible decisions and
changed their positions based on these
unappealed and heretofore unchallenged final
orders.
534 Further, the Original Interested Individuals, whose
looming default judgments led to the district court's reformation
of the Trust, have expressed that their settlements with the
Trust were predicated upon the Trust's reformation. That is,
"[h]ad it not been for the UEP Trust's reformation, the Original
Interested Individuals would never have settled their lawsuits
against the Trust." The FLDS Association's delay in filing this
petition has injured the Original Interested Individuals because
it has caused the Individuals to change positions on their own
claims, and any relief we granted the FLDS Association would

15 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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operate against the interests of the Original Interested
Individuals.
I
SI35 In sum, many individuals have relied upon the district
court's final order from over three years ago, and the FLDS
Association has given no adequate explanation for its delay in
appealing or otherwise petitioning for relief. The FLDS
Association has shown a lack of diligence in challenging the
modification of the Trust, and this lack of diligence has
operated to the detriment of others. The FLDS Association offers
no adequate explanation for its delay and no other circumstances
exist that might make us otherwise hesitant to apply laches.
Accordingly, we dismiss the FLDS Association's Trust modification
claims pursuant to the doctrine of laches.
II.

THE FLDS ASSOCIATION'S TRUST ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS ARE ALSO
BARRED BY LACHES, EXCEPT ONE THAT IS NOT RIPE FOR OUR
CONSIDERATION

536 The FLDS Association's remaining claims, many of which
merely recharacterize its first claim, either suffer from the
same lack of diligence as its Trust modification claims and are
also barred by laches, except one claim that is barred because
it is not ripe for our consideration. The FLDS Association
claims that the continuing administration of the Trust violates
its members' constitutional rights. The FLDS Association cites
Colorado Christian University v. Weaver—a case that held
unconstitutional publicly funded scholarships for students
attending public, private, and sectarian, but not pervasively
sectarian universities29--for the propositions that the
Establishment Clause forbids discrimination within and among
religions, intrusive inquiry into religious matters, and forcing
people to choose between their religious beliefs and government
benefits. The FLDS Association complains of five actions taken
by the district court—characterized as pertaining to the
administration of the Trust—that the Association feels are
constitutionally infirm.
SI37 But the first four of these actions either occurred
before or as part of the district court's modification of the
Trust and, just as the modification claims discussed in Part I,
could have been and should have been brought three years ago.
For instance, the FLDS Association first claims that the district
court did not properly consider the special fiduciary's
background and qualifications before selecting him. But the
special fiduciary was selected before the Trust was modified.
29

534 F.3d 1245, 1250, 1269 (10th Cir. 2008).
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The FLDS Association next claims that the court improperly
allowed FLDS detractors to take the "laboring oar" in drafting
the reformed Trust. But this claim is really a
recharacterization of the claim discussed in Part I, because it
goes to the Trust's modification and not its subsequent
administration. The FLDS Association's third claim—that the
Special Fiduciary and the individuals who sued the Trust openly
shared with the court that their purpose in reforming the Trust
was to transform FLDS culture and liberate the FLDS people—also
goes to the modification of the Trust rather than its
administration. The fourth claim complains that the advisory
board that the district court selected consisted of enemies of
the FLDS Church. But the advisory board was created by the
district court's December 2005 order, issued ten months before
the Trust was modified.
ST38 To the degree that any of these claims actually go to
Trust administration and are not merely recharacterizations of
the modification claims, any claims arising out of events that
occurred during or before Trust modification suffer from the same
defects as the FLDS Association's first claims: a lack of
diligence and prejudice resulting from that lack of diligence.
Here again, the FLDS Association could have brought these claims
at least three years earlier. In the interim, parties have
changed their positions, Trust participants have made
irreversible decisions, and the special fiduciary has entered
into irrevocable transactions and obligations. For the same
reasons as discussed in Part I, these claims are barred by the
equitable doctrine of laches.
539 Only the FLDS Association's fifth claim arises from
facts that occurred after the Trust was modified. Here the FLDS
Association alleges that the district court endorsed a religious
test that would give former FLDS members outright deeds to Trust
property but would relegate current and practicing FLDS members
to receiving spendthrift trusts based on the concern that they
might deed their property back to FLDS Church leaders. It
alleges that taking FLDS members' religion into consideration
when determining eligibility for transfers of property from the
Trust violates the members' First Amendment rights by forcing
them to choose between their religion and a government benefit.
140
But even on its face, the FLDS Association's last claim
is not ripe. The ripeness doctrine "serves to prevent courts

17 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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from issuing advisory opinions" on issues that are not ripe for
adjudication.30
(

A dispute is ripe when a conflict over the
application of a legal provision has
sharpened into an actual or imminent clash of
legal rights and obligations between the
parties thereto. An issue is not ripe for
appeal if there exists no more than a
difference of opinion regarding the
hypothetical application of a provision to a
situation in which the parties might, at some
future time, find themselves.31
An issue is not ripe, for instance, in a situation where even if
we agree with the petitioner's legal analysis of an issue, such
an analysis would have no application to the facts the petitioner
alleges.32 Even if we were to agree with the FLDS Association's
assertion that district court relegation of FLDS Church members
to receiving spendthrift trusts on the basis of their religion
would violate the state and federal constitutions, that analysis
would not apply to the facts the FLDS Association has alleged.
541 The FLDS Association does not allege that either the
district court or special fiduciary has actually used religion as
a factor in determining how to parse out property. It does not
cite any instance where an active FLDS member received a lesser
delegation of property because of his or her religious beliefs.
So, the FLDS Association does not assert an "actual" clash of
legal rights. And given the district court's and the special
fiduciary's assertions both in district court hearings and at
oral argument in this case that a religious test would not be
imposed—a position the FLDS Association acknowledges the special
30

State v. Ortiz, 1999 UT 84, 1 2, 987 P.2d 39; see also
Clegg v. Wasatch Cntv., 2010 UT 5, f 26, 227 P.3d 1243.
31

Bodell Constr. Co. v. Robbins, 2009 UT 52, 5 29, 215 P.3d
933 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coal., Inc. v. State, 2004 UT
32, 1 20, 94 P.3d 217 ("[A]n issue is not ripe for review where
there is no actual or imminent clash between the parties."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
32

See. Bd. of Trs. v. Keystone Conversions, LLC, 2004 UT 84,
f 32, 103 P„3d 686 (declining to reach the merits of the
appellant's argument because the appellant's claim of harm was
purely hypothetical and not yet realized).
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fiduciary has taken--such a clash does not seem "imminent," but
rather merely "hypothetical." At most, the discussions the FLDS
Association cites evince a concern shared by the district court
and the special fiduciary that, without careful planning, Trust
distributions could lead to the creation of a new trust
containing many of the same attributes that have, on more than
one occasion, landed the UEP Trust in Utah courts. But this does
not mean that the district court "actually" has or "imminently"
will use religion to discriminate against FLDS members, so this
last claim is not ripe for our review.
SI42 Because most of the FLDS Association's Trust
administration claims suffer from the same lack of diligence and
resultant prejudice as its modification claims, those claims are
also barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. The FLDS
Association's claim that the district court might use religion as
a basis for determining property distributions is not ripe
because the FLDS Association does not allege that such
discriminatory distributions have actually occurred or are
imminent.
CONCLUSION
543 The FLDS Association was not diligent in challenging
the district court's modification of the UEP Trust, and that lack
of diligence has resulted in prejudice to numerous parties.
Therefore, the FLDS Association's Trust modification claims are
barred by the equitable doctrine of laches. The FLDS
Association's remaining Trust administration claims suffer from
the same lack of diligence and resultant prejudice and are
similarly barred by laches, except for one claim that is barred
because it is unripe for adjudication. Accordingly, we decline
to reach the merits of these claims and dismiss the FLDS
Association's Petition for Extraordinary Writ.

5144 Chief Justice Durham, Justice Parrish, Justice Nehring,
and Judge Thorne concur in Associate Chief Justice Durrant's
opinion.
5145

Court of Appeals Judge William A. Thorne sat.
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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

THE FUNDAMENTALIST CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY
SAINTS, an Association of Individuals,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No. 2:08-cv-772

BRUCE R. WISAN, Special Fiduciary of the
United Effort Plan Trust; MARK
SHURTLEFF, Attorney General for the State
of Utah; THOMAS C. HORNE, Attorney
General for the State of Arizona; and
DENISE POSSE LINDBERG, Judge of the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah,

Judge Dee Benson

Defendants.

Before the court is the plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. The issue presented by the motion and the case itself is straightforward:
Are the defendants' actions in reforming and administering the United Effort Plan Trust ("UEP
Trust" or the "Trust") in violation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution?

1
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HISTORY
The plaintiffs are approximately 5,000 members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("FLDS"). The FLDS church has its origins in the teachings of

{

Joseph Smith, Jr. who, after publishing The Book of Mormon in 1829, organized the Church of
Christ with 6 original members in upstate New York in 1830. The Church of Christ later became
known as The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, often identified as the Mormon
church. The church left New York shortly after its founding, and after failed efforts at
settlements in Kirtland, Ohio, Jackson County, Missouri, and Nauvoo, Illinois, eventually
I
established itself in Salt Lake City, Utah Territory, in 1847.
Among the Mormon church's earliest tenets was a belief in the commingling of assets.
This practice is described in a book of revelations received by Joseph Smith called The Doctrine

<

and Covenants, which the Mormons regard as holy scripture. Section 42, verses 30-34 of The
Doctrine and Covenants read as follows:
I
30 And behold, thou wilt remember the poor, and consecrate of thy properties for
their support that which thou has to impart unto them, with a covenant and a deed
which cannot be broken.
31 And inasmuch as ye impart of your substance unto the poor, ye will do it unto
me; and they shall be laid before the bishop of my church and his counselors, two of
the elders, or high priests, such as he shall appoint or has appointed and set apart for
that purpose.
32 And it shall come to pass, that after they are laid before the bishop of my
church, and after that he has received these testimonies concerning the consecration
of the properties of my church, that they cannot be taken from the church, agreeable
to my commandments, every man shall be made accountable unto me, a steward over
his own property, or that which he has received by consecration, as much as is
sufficientforhimself and family.
33
And again, if there shall be properties in the hands of the church, or any
individuals of it, more than is necessary for their support after this first consecration,
which is a residue to be consecrated unto the bishop, it shall be kept to administer to
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those who have not, from time to time, that every man who has need may be amply
supplied and receive according to his wants.
34 Therefore, the residue shall be kept in my storehouse, to administer to the poor
and the needy, as shall be appointed by the high council of the church, and the bishop
and his council;
This practice of community property sharing was generally referred to as the United
Order or the Law of Consecration and was attempted with various amounts of sporadic success
by the early Mormons in Ohio, Missouri, Illinois, and Utah. The southern Utah city of
Orderville was originally settled by Mormon pioneers for the purpose of practicing strict
adherence to the United Order. Orderville (population 608) is still a functioning city but any
efforts to practice the United Order there were abandoned long ago.
One of the other 19th century characteristics of the Mormon church was the practice of
polygamy. Much has been written about this aspect of early Mormonism and how it influenced
the political and social aspects of the growth and development of the Territory of Utah in the
second half of the 19th century. See Shayna M. Sigman, Everything Lawyers Know About
Polygamy is Wrong, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101 (2006); Rex Sears, Punishing the Saints
for their "Peculiar Institution": Congress on the Constitutional Dilemmas, 2001 UTAHL. REV.
581 (2001). Polygamy was, and remains, against federal law. Eventually, the Mormon church
eliminated polygamy from its practices and in 1890 officially declared that its members were to
no longer engage in polygamous relationships. Utah was thereafter granted statehood in 1896.
Polygamy has been against the law in Utah ever since. The abandonment of the practice of
polygamy by the mainstream Mormon church did not rest well with all people, leading some to
continue the practice of polygamy, even though it was in violation of both federal and state law,
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and in some instances to form splinter groups of like-minded practitioners. The FLDS church is
one of these.
According to the plaintiffs, they and their church have always believed in and attempted

{

to practice the United Order or the Law of Consecration, as outlined in The Doctrine and
Covenants. The fundamentalist movement that led to the creation of the FLDS church was
formerly known as the "Priesthood Work." Its leaders (called the "Priesthood Council") formed
a trust in 1942 in order to live the United Order. The trust was called the United Effort Plan and
declared that its "purpose and object... shall first be charitable and philanthropic" and its
operations were to be "governed by the true spirit of brotherhood." Declaration of Trust, dated
November 9,1942, at 4. Membership in the 1942 trust was based on "the consecration of such
property, real, personal or mixed, to the trust in such amounts as shall be deemed sufficient by

<

the Board of Trustees." Id. at 7.
In the early 1990s, the trustees of the 1942 trust were sued by a group of trust residents
i
who alleged breach of fiduciary duties and other claims. The state district court found the trust
to be charitable in nature, which ruling was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court on Sept. 1,
1998. The Utah Supreme Court held that the 1942 trust was not "charitable" because it

<

"benefitted specific individuals" and because "beneficiaries must consecrate property to benefit
from the trust." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1252 (Utah 1998). At the time of this
pronouncement in 1998, there was apparently only one remaining founder of the 1942 trust,
Rulon T. Jeffs, who was at that time also serving as the President of the FLDS church.
In response to the 1998 decision of the Utah Supreme Court, Rulon Jeffs took steps to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
4
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

.

amend the trust to "ensure that his beneficial interest in the [trust] property be devoted to its
intended charitable purpose." FLDS v. Lindberg, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Petition for Extraordinary Writ at 9. Hence, on November 3, 1998, Rulon T. Jeffs,
Fred M. Jessop, LeRoy S. Jeffs, Warren S. Jeffs, Truman I. Barlow, Winston K. Blackmore,
James K. Zitting, as Trustees, and Rulon T. Jeffs, President and Corporation Sole, for the FLDS
church, executed the "Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust and the United Effort Plan."
The purpose for amending the trust was to make sure it qualified as a charitable trust
under Utah law. Accordingly, its beneficiary class was expanded to include not just those who
founded the trust, but all FLDS church members who "consecrate their lives, times, talents, and
resources to the building and establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth under the direction
of the President of the [FLDS] church." Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust of the
United Effort Plan Trust, dated November 3,1998, at 3. The "Declaration of Trust" of the 1998
Restated Trust states that it "is a religious and charitable trust" and "a spiritual (Doctrine and
Covenants 29:34) step toward living the Holy United Order." Id. at 1.
Prior to 1942, and continually to 1998, the Priesthood Work (the FLDS church) was
headquartered in a community straddling the border of Utah and Arizona known originally as
Short Creek. Today, although it still operates generally as one community, the section located in
Arizona is known as Colorado City, Arizona and the section located in Utah is known as Hildale,
Utah. The community presently consists of some 5,000 acres of land, comprising approximately
700 houses, and various farms, dairies, and other businesses and operations. Virtually all of this
property is within the UEP Trust. By some estimates, it has a value of $100,000,000.00. Eric G.
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Andersen, Protecting Religious Liberty Through the Establishment Clause: The Case of the
United Effort Plan Trust Litigation, 2008 U T A H L . REV. 739, 742 (2008).
The 1998 .Amended UEP Trust is a relatively brief (4 page) document. The Trust
specifically declares that it "exists to preserve and advance the religious doctrine and goals of the
Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, previously known as 'The
Priesthood Work' and refers to the Holy United Order as a 'central principle of the church.'" It
further states that "the doctrines and laws of the Priesthood and the [FLDS] Church . . . are the
guiding tenets by which the Trustees of the United Effort Plan Trust shall act." Id. The Trust
also declares that the trustees are to "administer the Trust consistent with its religious purpose to
provide for Church members, according to their wants and needs, insofar as their wants are just
(Doctrine and Covenants 82:17-21)." Id. at 3.

i

The plaintiffs claim in this lawsuit that the Trust is an important part of their religion and
that all decisions regarding their "just wants and needs" are fundamentally religious
i
determinations. (Willie Jessop Aff. f 23.) They cite to the Trust itself as evidence that
continued enjoyment of Trust participation is conditioned on living in accordance with the
principles of the United Order as determined by those in ecclesiastical leadership. In the event

i

of termination of the Trust, the Trust provides that "the assets of the Trust Estate at that time
shall become the property of the Corporation of the President of the Fundamentalist Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, corporation sole." Amended and Restated Declaration of
Trust at 4.
i

6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Warren Jeffs and State Action
In 2002, Rulon Jeffs died. His son, Warren, replaced him as prophet and president of the
FLDS church and as president of the board of trustees of the UEP Trust. Under its new leader,
the FLDS church began moving some of its followers to a new site near Eldorado, Texas. As the
first decade of the 21st century progressed, the church, its president and its members became
embroiled in many legal disputes, both civil and criminal. In one of the most publicized of these,
Warren Jeffs was charged with aiding and abetting rape, a first-degree felony, in Utah's Fifth
District Court in 2005. This criminal charge stemmed from Jeffs' involvement in an arranged
marriage between two members of the FLDS church, one of whom was a 14-year-old girl at the
time, and who has since left the church.
In July and August of 2004, two tort lawsuits were filed against Warren Jeffs, the Trust,
the FLDS church, and other defendants in Utah's Third District Court in Salt Lake County. The
claims included allegations of child sexual abuse. Jeffs and the other trustees failed to defend
these lawsuits, which exposed the Trust to possible default judgments. During this time, there is
evidence to suggest Jeffs' decision to do nothing in defense of the lawsuits against the Trust was
deliberate, possibly motivated by his belief that his followers should leave the Short Creek area
and relocate to Texas. Whatever his motivation, however, it appears undisputed that he
instructed his followers to "answer them (the state authorities) nothing and don't give them any
testimony or witness." (Def. Wisan's Mem. Opp. at 10.)
In May, 2005, as a result of Mr. Jeffs' and the other trustees' actions in failing to defend
against the tort lawsuits, the Utah and Arizona Attorneys General filed a petition in Utah's Third
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District Court seeking the removal or suspension of the trustees of the Trust. The Attorneys
General based their decision to file the action on the belief that the trustees of the Trust,
particularly Warren Jeffs, were violating their fiduciary duties by not appropriately responding to
the tort lawsuits, which placed the beneficiaries of the charitable Trust at risk of being evicted
from the Trust's homes and property. The petition was in the nature of a probate action pursuant
to the Utah Uniform Trust Code and requested "an immediate order suspending the authority and
power of the current trustees pending a final decision by the Court on their removal and
appointing an interim special fiduciary for the limited purpose of preserving the assets of the
trust," along with other relief. In the Matter of the United Effort Plan Trust, Case No.
053900848, Utah Attorney General's Petition at 2.
Just as with the tort lawsuits, the trustees did not respond in any fashion to the probate

{

action. Thereafter, the Third District Court granted relief. First, on June 16, 2005, Judge Deno
Himonas entered an order suspending the trustees and appointing Mr. Bruce Wisan as a Special
\

Fiduciary, as requested by the Utah Attorney General. Then, on September 2, 2005, Judge
Denise Lindberg entered an "order on Procedure to Appoint Trustees and Expansion of Special
Fiduciary's Authority." This order generally authorized Mr. Wisan to do what he deemed

<

prudent and reasonable to manage the Trust property, to defend against the tort lawsuits and to
see that property and other taxes were paid. See In the Matter of the United Effort Plan Trust,
i
Case No. 053900848, Order on Procedure to Appoint Trustees and Expansion of Special
Fiduciary's Authority at 2-4.
During the next three months, various proposals were made to the state court seeking the
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appointment of substitute trustees and reformation of the Trust. These proposals came
exclusively from persons who had sued the Trust, including former members of the FLDS
church.
As these activities were taking place, and after having been criminally charged with
aiding and abetting rape, Warren Jeffs' whereabouts were unknown. He was eventually found
on August 28, 2006, in a Cadillac Escalade which was stopped on a Nevada highway for a traffic
violation. He has been incarcerated on one charge or another ever since. During 2005 and
throughout 2006, his followers, including the plaintiffs here, continued to do nothing to respond
to either the tort lawsuits against the Trust or the probate action because that was what their
prophet told them to do. As a result, it appears the only people the court was hearing from were
the state Attorneys General and those who opposed the regime of Warren Jeffs.
After considering the various reform proposals, Judge Lindberg issued a rather lengthy
Memorandum Decision on December 13, 2005, in which she determined that because of the
malfeasance of its trustees, the UEP Trust should be reformed. At this point, the court clearly
had three options pursuant to the Utah Uniform Trust Code. The district judge could (1) do
nothing, (2) allow the Trust to be terminated pursuant to its own terms, or (3) reform the Trust
and appoint new leadership to administer the Trust. She chose the last of these, apparently in an
effort to protect the property and its beneficiaries.
In her Memorandum Decision, Judge Lindberg concluded that the 1998 Trust document
is the "operative instrument" for the court to consider, and that it qualifies as a charitable trust.
She further determined that the Trust should be modified "in a manner consistent with the

9
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settlor's charitable purposes."
The court also determined, consistent with its understanding of the United States
Constitution, that it could not reform the Trust on the basis of religious doctrine or principles.
The judge therefore stated that the reformation would avoid constitutional problems by applying
"neutral principles of law" as explained in Jones v. Wolf 443 U.S. 595 (1979), and other United
States Supreme court precedent. She stated: "courts must separate that which is primarily
ecclesiastical from that which is primarily secular," and not enter the discussion of the former.
In the Matter of the United Effort Plan Trust, Case No. 053900848, dated December 13, 2005 at
Tf 35. She read the 1998 Trust as having a religious part (she called it "the Plan," which was
essentially a reference to the United Order concept) and a secular part (which she called "the
Trust"), and declared that the goal of the reformation process was to "create a clear division
between the two." Id, at f 39. Finally, in her Memorandum Decision, Judge Lindberg invited
proposals for the final reformation of the Trust. Id. at \ 56.
On October 25, 2006, nearly a year later, the court created the Reformed Trust, replacing
the original 4-page document, with its 17 paragraphs, with a new version of 175 paragraphs. The
reformation significantly expanded the powers of the Special Fiduciary. Under his new
authority, Mr. Wisan was to implement a "strategic plan to subdivide Trust property so that it
can be conveyed to members of the beneficiary class in a religiously neutral manner in
furtherance of the Reformed Trust's purpose to serve the 'just wants and needs' (primarily
housing) of all persons who consecrated to the Trust." (Def. Wisan's Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Approval of Sale of Trust Property dated October 27, 2008 at 2.)
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Under the Reformed Trust, it became the responsibility of the state appointed Special
Fiduciary to determine the "just wants and needs" of the people who live and depend on the
Trust property. It is up to the Special Fiduciary and the "Advisory Board" of the Reformed Trust
to decide who is entitled to live in which homes and when they need to move. Apparently in an
attempt at humor, the Special Fiduciary initially introduced himself to the members of the FLDS
church as the "State-ordained Bishop." (Willie Jessop Aff. fflf 26-27.) What the members of the
FLDS church formerly took to their church leaders regarding administration of Trust assets they
are now supposed to take to the Special Fiduciary who is under order of the state court to decide
such matters by "neutral principles" and may not rely on matters of faith or religion.
After the state court's reformation of the UEP Trust in December 2006, the Special
Fiduciary assembled a team of people, including accountants, lawyers, and other professionals to
administer the Trust property and determine the wants and needs of the people. With dozens, if
not hundreds, of properties to manage, and a considerable number of disputes over who was
entitled to what, the Special Fiduciary's expenses mounted. During 2007 and into 2008, the
former trustees, and the members of the FLDS church, including the present plaintiffs, continued
to remain largely uninvolved in the probate action in state court. In mid-2008, however, that
changed for what appear to be 2 reasons. First, Warren Jeffs apparently had a change of opinion
about asserting his and his church members' legal rights in court, and second, the Special
Fiduciary announced an intention to sell certain Trust property that held special economic,
historical and spiritual significance to the FLDS community, including, notably, the Berry Knoll
Farm, which, according to the plaintiffs, is "a part of the prophetic vision and divine command

11
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that the Short Creek area will become a garden spot of the west, and is the location of a temple
site as divinely revealed to church leaders." (Willie Jessop Aff. ^f 39.)
The Special Fiduciary told the state court he needed to sell Trust property, including
specifically the Berry Knoll Farm, to "resolve the current cash crunch problems," which referred
to the multimillion dollar obligations owed to the Special Fiduciary's legal, accounting, and
other functionaries.
This request by the Special Fiduciary caused the plaintiffs to do two things. First, they
sought to intervene in the probate action for the purpose of asserting their rights. This was
denied by Judge Lindberg on the ground that the plaintiffs did not have standing as parties in the
probate action. Second, they filed this federal lawsuit on October 6, 2008, seeking a declaration
that the state actors' conduct violates the United States Constitution.
At the outset of this federal case, the plaintiffs sought a Temporary Restraining Order
halting the sale of the Berry Knoll Farm and all other actions of the Special Fiduciary. A hearing
i

on the matter was held on November 12, 2008, with all parties present and represented. After a
lengthy hearing, it was determined that the parties were willing to mutually agree that nothing
would be done to proceed with the property sale or to otherwise affect the Trust property until
the parties either reached a settlement or resumed the matter in court. Accordingly, this action
was stayed pending further action of the parties.
During 2009, while this action was stayed, the parties engaged in extensive settlement
efforts with former United States District Judge Paul Cassel, but were unable to reach a final
settlement. Thereafter, the state court issued a decision authorizing the sale of the Berry Knoll
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Farm to the highest bidder. This caused the plaintiffs to file an action in the Utah Supreme
Court, styled as a Petition for Extraordinary Writ, in which they sought virtually the same relief
sought in this action: a declaration that the state district court's reformation and administration of
the UEP Trust is a violation of the Constitution.
The Utah Supreme Court issued its decision on August 27, 2010, finding the action
barred by laches. At that point, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for injunctive relief before
this court. After briefing, a hearing was held on December 3, 2010, with Rodney Parker,
Frederick Gedicks, and Stephen Clark representing the plaintiffs and Jeffrey Shields, William
Richards, and Jerrold Jensen representing the defendants. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court asked the parties to attempt to mutually agree on a preservation of the status quo pending a
decision on the motion. They later reported to the court that they could not agree. Accordingly,
this court entered a Temporary Restraining Order as of December 13, 2010, generally preserving
the status quo until a decision can be rendered on the motion. Among other things, the Order
prohibits any action on the sale of the Berry Knoll Farm and stays further action on any plans to
subdivide the Trust property.
DISCUSSION
The Establishment Clause
The First Amendment declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion

" U.S. CONST, amend. I. From its passage by the First Congress in

1791, this clause, popularly known as the Establishment Clause, has been consistently
interpreted as prohibiting the federal government from establishing a national church and, in
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more general terms, as keeping separate the spheres of church and state. The framers of the
Constitution sought to keep the government out of the affairs of the churches of America, and
vice versa. After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment following the Civil War, the United
States Supreme Court determined that the Establishment Clause is applicable to the states. See
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
Everson v. Board of Education was the first major Establishment Clause case. It
involved a New Jersey state law that provided for the parents of students who attended private
and Catholic schools in Ewing, New Jersey to be repaid for the bus fares they paid to get their
children to and from school. A taxpayer challenged the law as unconstitutional because it
benefitted the Catholic Church.
In an 18-page opinion for the 5-justice majority, Justice Hugo Black took considerable
effort to explain the historical underpinnings of the Establishment Clause. After quoting from a
letter Thomas Jefferson wrote to the Danbury Baptist Church, he wrote: "The First Amendment
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We
could not approve the slightest breach." Id. at 18.
After such strict wording, one may have thought the New Jersey bus fare law was
doomed, but it was deemed not to violate the Constitution because the state involvement was so
minimal. The Court found that "the State contributes no money to the schools. It does not
support them. Its legislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program to help
parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from
accredited schools." Id. at 19.
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The next year in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the Supreme
Court repeated its Everson Establishment Clause analysis in a case involving a program in the
public schools of Illinois that allowed for release time for students to receive religious
instruction. The Court, this time unanimously, found the Illinois practice in violation of the
Establishment Clause, stating:
This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-supported
public school system to aid religious groups to spread their faith. And it falls
squarely under the ban of the First Amendment (made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth) as we interpreted it in Everson v. Board of Education. There we said:
'Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.'
Id. at 6.
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause caseload increased significantly after
McCollum, and as those two pioneering cases illustrated, the result depended on the unique facts
of each case. Notable Establishment Clause cases followed including: Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962), where the Court struck down as unconstitutional a state-written prayer required to be
said at the beginning of the school day in the public schools in the state of New York; Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), in which a creche display was found to violate the Establishment
Clause because of its primarily religious nature; and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977), in
which the Court found that it was constitutionally permissible for a state to provide, among other
things, funds to nonpublic schools including those operated by religious institutions to purchase
secular textbooks for use by their students.1

^ther important Establishment Clause cases include: Wallace v. Jaffree, 412 U.S. 38
(1985) (holding that mandatory moment of silence in schools for the purpose of private prayer
violated the Establishment Clause); Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union Greater
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After a number of these fact-intensive inquiries, the United States Supreme Court
announced a three-part test in what has become perhaps the most cited Supreme Court
Establishment Clause case, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). There the Court stated
that for state action to pass constitutional muster it must meet each of the following three
requirements:
(1) it must have a secular purpose,
(2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and
(3) it must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently confirmed that the "purpose and effect
prongs" of Lemon are to be interpreted "in light of Justice O'Connor's endorsement test."

Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (striking down a creche display in a county courthouse
which contained the phrase Gloria in Excelsis Deo while upholding the display of a nearby
menorah, which appeared with a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that offering of prayer before a voluntarily attended graduation was
unconstitutional); Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding that a
vote of the student body could not authorize student-led prayer prior to school events); Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding the constitutionality of private school
vouchers); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that a Ten Commandments display
at the Texas state capital capitol did not violate the Establishment Clause because of its secular
purpose); McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (striking down a Ten
Commandments display in several courthouses because it was not integrated with a secular
purpose); O'Connor v. Washburn University, 416 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that
the Tenth Circuit uses Justice O'Connor's endorsement test to interpret the purpose and effect
prongs of Lemon for Establishment Clause analysis); American Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 2010
WL 5151630 (10th Cir. 2010) (striking down the use of memorial crosses to commemorate
fallen highway troopers in Utah); Trunk v. City of San Diego, — F.3d —, 2011 WL 9636 (9th
Cir. 2011) (holding that a large Latin cross located on city property on top of Mount Soledad in
San Diego violates the Establishment Clause).
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Weinbaum v. City of Las Cruces, KM., 541 F.3d 1017, 1030 (10th Cir. 2008). "Under the
'endorsement test,' the 'government impermissibly endorses religion if its conduct has either (1)
the purpose or (2) the effect of conveying a message that religion or a particular religious belief
is favored or preferred."' Id. (quoting Bauchman v. West High School, 132 F.3d 542, 551 (10th
Cir. 1997)).
Against this established Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, we turn to the
question whether the states' actions in this case violate the Establishment Clause. The answer is
an unqualified "yes." A better question would be how do they not? Virtually from its first step
after it decided to reform the Trust, the state court was in forbidden territory. It not only had no
authority to determine the "just wants and needs" of the members of the FLDS church, but it had
no authority to interpret or reform the Trust at all.
In fairness to the state district court, it did not have anyone initially presenting an
Establishment Clause challenge, but it is still difficult with the benefit of hindsight to see how
the court that was in one respect so mindful of using "neutral principles" to avoid
unconstitutional behavior could at the same time fail to recognize that in reforming the Trust as it
did it was essentially taking over one of the central tenets of the FLDS religion. In so doing it
violated the Establishment Clause. By reforming a religious trust and managing it without
regard to religion, the state actors became impermissibly entangled with religion. While it is
accurate to say the states' actions did not establish a religion, their actions certainly went a long
way toward disestablishing one. No matter how one analyzes the states' action against the
second and third prongs of the Lemon test, they come up lacking. The primary effect of the state
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court's decision to rewrite the Trust and administer it as a secular instrument was to inhibit
religion. The resulting intrusion into the everyday life of the FLDS church and its members
fostered not only "excessive government entanglement with religion," but was a virtual takeover
by the state.
The court finds it interesting, and somewhat telling, that the defendants' responses to the
plaintiffs' constitutional challenges are so tepid as to be nearly nonexistent. In extensive briefing
in this case, the defendants cite no case that is even suggested to be remotely similar enough to
the instant case to support their defense. This is because there isn't one. The defense amounts to
nothing more than a repeat of why the state actors felt it was so important for them to take the
action they took, as opposed to why it was constitutionally justified. The defendants speak at
long length about how bad-even criminal-Warren Jeffs' behavior was, but they say little that is

<

relevant to defend their own wholesale interference with an established church. The Arizona
Attorney General's response to the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments is less than one-half of
one page (see Arizona Attorney General's Opp. Mem. at p.24-25) and cites no cases or other
authority in support of its position.
The plainness of the state court's breaching of the wall of separation between church and
state is found in an objective reading of the 4-page 1998 UEP Trust itself. One simply cannot
read that document and fail to see that it is a religious document. As stated earlier, this
document consists of only 17 paragraphs. It is straightforward and uncomplicated. Because a
correct understanding of what it says is so important to a full appreciation of its religious nature,
representative sections are reprinted below:
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The United Effort Plan Trust is a religious and charitable trust. It is the legal
entity of the United effort Plan. The Trust was created by Declaration of trust dated
November 9, 1942, and was amended April 10, 1946.
The United Effort Plan Trust is a spiritual (Doctrine & Covenants 29:34) step
toward living the Holy United Order. It exists to preserve and advance the religious
doctrines and goals of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, previously known as "The Priesthood Work," or "The Work" (the "Church").
The United Effort Plan is under the direction of the President of the Church, who
holds the keys of Priesthood authority (which keys have continued from Joseph
Smith, Jr. To Brigham Young, John Taylor, John W. Woolley, Lorin c. Woolley,
John Y. Barlow, Leroy S. Johnson, and Rulon T. Jeffs). The doctrines and laws of
the Priesthood and the Church are found in the Book of Mormon, the Doctrine and
Covenants, the Pearl of Great Price, the Holyl Bible, the sermons of the holders of
the keys of Priesthood authority, and present and future revelations received through
the holder of those keys; and are the guiding tenets by which the Trustees of the
United Effort Plan Trust shall act.
***

Rulon T. Jeffs holds the keys of Priesthood authority and so serves as the
President of the Church. President Jeffs is also the sole remaining original Trustee
and subscriber of the United Effort Plan Trust, and President of the Board of Trustees
of the United Effort Plan Trust. In those capacities he, and Fred M. Jessop, LeRoy
S. Jeffs, Warren S. Jeffs, Truman I. Barlow, Winston K. Blackmore and James K.
Zitting, as Trustees, hereby amend and restate the Declaration of Trust to more
clearly set out its purposes and manner of operation. This document is a total
restatement and amendment of the Declaration of Trust. It supersedes all previous
documents, including all documents filed of public record in Utah and Arizona and
with various courts. The Corporation of the President of the Fundamentalist Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, a corporation sole, hereby ratifies this
amendment. This Amended and restated Declaration of Trust has also been
approved by the Priesthood and sustained by the Church membership. Because the
Trust is a charitable trust, this Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust will be
recorded in the public record but no future affidavits of disclosure will be recorded.
###

Since the original conveyance substantial additional real estate has been
added as consecrations to the Trust Estate, and parcels have been purchased, traded,
subjected to rights-of-way, and dedicated as roads and streets. It is anticipated that
property will continue to be added as consecrations to the Trust Estate. Property has
19
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been conveyed as consecrations to the United Effort Plan Trust in the name of the
United Effort Plan; as well as in the names of Trustees or of a single Trustee such as
in the name of Fred M. Jessop, as Trustee. All properties now included or hereafter
added to the Trust Estate are consecrated and sacred lands, dedicated to the United
Effort Plan's religious purpose.
The United Effort Plan is the effort and striving on the part of Church
members toward the Holy United Order. This central principle of the church
requires the gathering together of faithful Church members on consecrated and
sacred lands to establish as one pure people the Kingdom of God on Earth under the
guidance of Priesthood leadership. The Board of Trustees, in their sole discretion,
shall administer the Trust consistent with its religious pupose to provide for Church
members according to their wants and their needs, insofar as their wants are just
(Doctrine and Covenants, Section 82:17-21).
A consecration is an unconditional dedication to a sacred purpose.
Consecration of real estate to the United Effort Plan Trust is accomplished by a deed
of conveyance. Church members also consecrate their time, talents, money, and
materials to the Lord's storehouse, to become the property of the Church and, where
appropriate, the United Effort Plan Trust. All consecrations made to or for the
benefit of the United Effort Plan Trust are dedicated to the sacred purpose of the
United Effort Plan and without any reservation or claim of right and/or ownership.
Improvements made by persons living on United Effort Plan Trust property become
the property of the Trust and are consecrations to the Trust.
The privilege to participate in the united Effort Plan and live upon the lands
and in the buildings of the United Effort Plan Trust is granted, and may be revoked,
by the Board of Trustees. Those who seek that privilege commit themselves and
their families to live their lives according to the principles of the United Effort Plan
and the Church, and they and their families consent to be governed by the Priesthood
leadership and the Board of Trustees. They must consecrate their lives, times, talents
and resources to the building and establishment of the Kingdom of God on Earth
under the direction of the President of the Church and his appointed officers. All
participants living on United Effort Plan Trust property must act in the spirit of
charity (Moroni 7:6-10, 45-48). They must live in the true spirit of brotherhood
(Matthew 22:36-40) and there shall be no disputations among them (3 Nephi 18:34).
The Trust is most firmly committed to these goals. People who are granted the
privilege to live on United Effort Plan Trust property acknowledge by their presence
upon the land their acceptance of the terms of this Trust.
Participation in the United Effort Plan and use of property owned by the
United Effort Plan Trust is not and does not become a right or claim of anyone who
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may benefit in any way from the Trust. Use of Trust property must be within rules
and standards set by the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees may require
individuals and their families to relocate to different locations on United Effort Plan
Trust property or to share a location with others. Participants who, in the opinion of
the Presidency of the Church, do not honor their commitments to live their lives
according to the principles of the United Effort Plan and the Church shall remove
themselves from the Trust property and, if they do not, the Board of Trustees may
in its discretion cause their removal. At such time as they reform their lives and the
lives of their family members and are again approved by the Priesthood and the
Board of Trustees they may again be permitted to participate in the United Effort
Plan. The Board of Trustees shall have no obligation whatsoever to return all or any
part of consecrated property back to a consecrator or to his or her descendants.
To carry out its religious mission and charitable purpose, the Trust shall be
administered by a Board of Trustees consisting of not less than three nor more than
nine Trustees appointed in writing by the President of the Church. Trustees shall
serve at the pleasure of the President of the Church and may be removed or replaced
at any time by the President. Dismissal of a Trustee shall be by a written notice,
effective on the date the notice is executed. A trustee m ay resign by written notice
to the President of the Church. Each successor Trustee shall have the same powers
and authority, and shall be subject to the same duties and restrictions, as predecessor
Trustees.
***

This Declaration of Trust may be amended at any time and from time to time
by the President of the Church and a majority of the Trustees. The Trust is intended
to be a charitable trust of perpetual duration; however, in the event of termination of
this Trust, whether by the board of Trustees or by reason of law, the assets of the
Trust Estate at that time shall become the property of the Corporation of the
President of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
corporation sole.
Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust at 1-4.
As noted above, the state court found this 1998 Trust to be the "governing instrument"
and that it constitutes a charitable trust. The state court judge then decided that in order to
"protect and maintain the charitable nature of the trust," that the Trust needed to be reformed
employing "neutral principles of law." The problem with this approach at the outset is that it
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involved the state court in the business of interpreting (that is, defining) a self-styled "religious"
and "spiritual" Trust that by its own language "exists to preserve and advance the religious
doctrines and goals of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints

" Id.

at 1. This is forbidden by the Establishment Clause. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16. To put it
plainly, once the state court read the 1998 Trust it should have recognized that it is a religious
document and done nothing further with it. Pursuant to the Establishment Clause, the court had
no business doing anything at all with or to the 1998 Trust once it was recognized as a religious
trust that is based on a fundamental tenet of the FLDS church. After reading it, the only thing
the court could do with this Trust was to leave it alone. Due to the malfeasance of the trustees in
not responding to the tort lawsuits, the court could revoke the Trust (as would be the case with
any failed charitable trust, religious or otherwise) and allow the trust property to be distributed in
accordance with the Trust's own terms, but the court was barred by the First Amendment from
doing anything more than that.
Nevertheless, the state court judge decided she could reform the document by seperating
the religious parts of the text from the secular parts of the text, an act which, even if it wasn't
forbidden, this court finds to be impossible. One may as well attempt to make Deuteronomy
secular, or the Koran, or to eliminate football from the Super Bowl. The religious nature of the
Trust is plain and obvious. To the extent there are aspects of the Trust that can be called secular,
they are unquestionably inextricably intertwined with the religious.
Next, after the court's impermissible behavior in construing and reforming the Trust, the
court continued its unconstitutional march into the realm of the religious by appointing a non-
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religious state functionary to manage and administer the newly interpreted trust in a new secular
way which forbids any religious reasons from informing his decisions. This activity goes far
beyond a government sponsored prayer (Engel), a state textbook program for religious-school
students (Wolmari), a graduation prayer at a public school (Lee), a stand-alone creche on
government property (Lynch), or any other example of impermissible state behavior found in the
growing body of Establishment Clause precedents.
Looking at this situation through the eyes of the plaintiffs, it is not difficult to see what
happened and its obvious enormous impact on the religious lives of the members of the FLDS
church. Before the court's reformation of the 1998 UEP Trust, before the appointment of the
Special Fiduciary, the plaintiffs, 5,000 or so in number, resided in homes belonging to the Trust,
worked in fields and factories and dairies belonging to the Trust, and had many of their personal
wants and needs involving food and shelter provided by the Trust; and all decisions about these
matters were made by their FLDS church leaders. And all of these decisions were based,
consistent with the Trust's language, on a large number of factors including whether they had
"commit[ted] themselves and their families to live" the United Order and the extent to which
they "act[ed] in the spirit of charity," "live[d] in the true spirit of brotherhood," and had "no
disputations among them." Amended and Restated Declaration of Trust at 3. In other words,
factors based on their religion and their faithfulness to it.
For bad or good, anyone who had agreed to the plan was subject to these same rules and
was bound to accept the decisions made by his or her religious leaders. There is no question
plaintiffs' religious faithfulness played a significant role in the administration of the Trust.
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The day the Special Fiduciary began his job, however, that was gone, replaced by a
secular authority who decided the same matters of Trust property distribution not only based on
an entirely new regime of secular criteria, but also on the express condition that religious reasons
could not be controlling. One's faithfulness to the principles of the church was replaced by
purely secular criteria such as caloric intake needs and whether more heat was needed for
warmth in the winter.
The state court's reliance on Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), is wholly misplaced.
Jones followed Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1968), which recognized that neutral principles of law may
be employed by courts to resolve church property disputes without running afoul of the
Establishment Clause if such principles are the type "for use in all property disputes" and do not
in any way require the court to interpret ecclesiastical questions. Id. at 449.
Indeed, as plaintiffs point out, in Jones the Supreme Court actually gave guidance to
religious organizations about how to structure their property documents to cover otherwise nonjusticiable contingencies:
Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious societies can
specify what is to happen to church property in the event of a particular contingency
. . . . In this manner, a religious organization can ensure that a dispute over the
ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the desires of its
members.
Jones, 443 U.S. at 603.
The 1998 Trust was structured in just this fashion by providing that in the event the Trust
failed, the Trust property would revert to the FLDS church. This would avoid the possibility of a
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non-justiciable contingency. But, rather than allow such a result, the state actors sought and
obtained a reformation of the Trust, which required disregarding all religious aspects of the Trust
and inventing what they called a secular instrument. Nothing about that process employed the
neutral principles referred to in Jones v. Wolf. First of all, the case before the state court did not
present a property dispute at all; it was occasioned by an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by its
trustees, not because of any property dispute over the property itself. Furthermore, even if the
case involved that type of internal church property dispute and neutral principles were
applicable, the practice did not give the state court the authority to revise or alter religious
church documents. Yet that is precisely what the state court did.
No matter how much the state court attempts to label its actions as applying neutral
principles and thereby avoid constitutional problems, what it did was an impermissible rewriting
of the Trust document, where the religious and secular are inextricably intertwined. There was
no proper use of the so-called "neutral principles."
In sum, from the unique facts of this case and consistent with the Establishment Clause
and its interpretation by the United States Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the state actors had no authority to act as they did. Under the circumstances, given the
trustees' failure to defend the trust against the tort lawsuits and their failure to defend against the
claims of malfeasance against them in the probate court, the state court could have allowed the
Trust to be revoked, but they had no authority, consistent with the United States Constitution, to
redefine the Trust, reform the Trust, or administer the Trust. Such state action constitutes
excessive involvement with religion in violation of the First Amendment. Accordingly, the
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plaintiffs have established that they are substantially likely to succeed on their Establishment
Clause claims for purposes of the requested preliminary injunction.
Free Exercise Clause
In addition to declaring that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion/' the First Amendment forbids Congress from "prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause is applicable to the states.
Cantwellv. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940).
The plaintiffs claim the defendants' actions violate their free exercise rights as well as the
Establishment Clause. This aspect of their case has not been the plaintiffs' primary focus either
in the written briefs or during oral argument. For purposes of the present motion for preliminary
injunctive relief, the plaintiffs' emphasis has in the main rested on their claim that the
Establishment Clause's structural bar has been violated.
The history of the Free Exercise Clause differs significantly from the Establishment
Clause. The most recent seismic shift in Free Exercise jurisprudence occurred in 1990 with
Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which
the United States Supreme Court held that state laws of general application may be applied to
churches and their members even if the consequences of such application interferes to some
extent with a persons's exercise of religion. The Smith case dealt with the state of Oregon's law
against the use of peyote. Several members of the Native American Church claimed that peyote
use was a necessary part of their religious ceremonies and that enforcement of the peyote law
against them would prevent their freedom to folly practice their religion. The Court disagreed

26 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and announced the holding stated above.
In accordance with Smith, in the instant case it appears that the state Attorneys Generals'
petitions to the Third District Court alleging malfeasance on the part of the UEP Trust's trustees
was a proper application of a Utah law. The trustees had chosen not to respond to two tort
lawsuits which put the Trust property in jeopardy. But that state action was not directed at the
plaintiffs. Quite to the contrary, the state action was designed to protect the Trust property for
the benefit of its beneficiaries, which included the plaintiffs.
The state action that did affect the plaintiffs was the decision to reform the Trust and turn
over management of the Trust property to the state's Special Fiduciary. As explained above, this
change in management completely altered the former way of dealing with the property, stripping
away any and all matters of religion and faith, which had previously been an important and
essential aspect of the property management system. The court recognizes there are differences
between the two religion clauses and there may be defenses available to the state actors in
relation to the plaintiffs' Free Exercise claims that are not available with respect to the
Establishment Clause claims. Because the Free Exercise clause has not yet received the detailed
attention of the parties, the court will at this point find only that under the present state of the
record the plaintiffs' Free Exercise claims appear substantially likely to succeed, and therefore
serve as additional support for preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiffs. On the present state
of the record it is difficult for this court to see how the states' action is not as violative of the
plaintiffs' Free Exercise rights as it is of the Establishment Clause. Simply put, the plaintiffs'
freedom to practice an important tenet of their religion (i.e. the sharing of their property on
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religious grounds under the direction of their religious leaders) was not only eliminated but was
replaced by a state-run secular program. If desired, however, the parties will be afforded an
opportunity to further develop the Free Exercise issues pending a final resolution of this case.
Jurisdictional and Preclusive Defenses
The defendants' primary defense is that this federal court either lacks jurisdiction or is
precluded from exercising its jurisdiction because of any or all of a wide-ranging variety of legal
doctrines that include (1) waiver, (2) res judicata, (3) the Full Faith and Credit Clause, (4) laches,
(5) unclean hands, (6) in custodia legis, (7) the Barton-Porter doctrine, (8) Younger abstention,
(9) absolute immunity, (10) qualified immunity, (11) standing and (12) the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. The court finds each of these to be either entirely inapplicable to the present case or
sufficiently lacking as a defense to provide merit for defendants' position and to prevent this
court from granting the plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief.
Most importantly, the majority of these doctrines are inapplicable because they depend
upon an underlying activity by the state where the state had jurisdiction and the authority to act.
As explained above, the plaintiffs' Establishment Clause claim is simply that the state court had
no authority to reform the 1998 Trust and thereafter take over its management. This court
agrees. The Constitution does not allow the state court of Utah or any other state into the realm
of religion. Once that boundary is crossed, the court is in forbidden territory and must leave.
Viewed in this way it is obvious the various preclusive doctrines mentioned above are not
applicable here. Waiver is not at issue because the structural limitation set by the Establishment
Clause cannot be waived. Such structural limitations cannot be waived by the government or
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private litigants. See e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1985) (re: legislative veto); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
The In Custodia Legis, Barton-Porter, and Rooker-Feldman doctrines are inapplicable
because each presupposes that the state court in a civil lawsuit has jurisdiction and authority over
the matter at issue, including trusts (in custodia legis), the behavior of a fiduciary (BartonPorter), or some other aspect of state court litigation (Rooker-Feldman). As explained above,
due to its religious character, the state had no authority over the Trust, other than to allow it to be
terminated. Furthermore, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable here because the
plaintiffs were not parties to the state proceedings and because this action was commenced prior
to the resolution of the state cases.
Younger abstention does not pertain to this case because the state court action in question
not only was without authority but also because it could hardly be said that the state courts of
Utah have an important state interest in enforcing their orders and judgments that are in violation
of the United States Constitution. Younger abstention is not applicable to a federal court
injunction suit involving allegations of state court proceedings in violation of the Bill of Rights.
Walckv. Edmondson, All F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2007).
With the exception of the state court judge's immunity, the immunity doctrines presented
by the defendants have no relevance at this stage of the case where only declaratory and
injunctive relief are sought. Under Ex Parte Young, all of the defendants are subject to such
prospective relief.
As for standing, the plaintiffs have the right to bring and prosecute this action pursuant to
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Article III of the United States Constitution and, more specifically, Rule 17(b)(3)(A) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs clearly have presented facts sufficient to present
a justifiable controversy that directly affects them in the conduct of their daily lives.
Laches and Res Judicata
With regard to laches and res judicata, the defendants claim the recent opinion of the
Utah Supreme Court which dismissed plaintiffs' case on the ground of laches bars this court
from further action. As an alternative, they claim that even if this court is not barred from
addressing plaintiffs' case by the doctrine of res judicata, this court should nonetheless dismiss
the case on the basis of its own independent finding of laches.
The court will first address whether it finds, independently, whether this action should be
dismissed on the basis of laches. Laches is an equitable doctrine that essentially focuses on a
party's untimeliness in bringing a claim and any injury that the delay caused to the other side.
Angelos v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1983). By its very nature, the inquiry
is fact intensive and depends on the unique circumstance of each case. The doctrine is invoked
relatively seldomly, primarily because of the existence of codified statutes of limitation, statutes
of repose, and the like, all of which also deal in large part with the issues of timeliness and
prejudice. In the end, basic fairness is the goal. If too many plans, decisions, contracts,
adjustments, and changes have been reasonably made on a party's failure to challenge a certain
action, at some point in time it is only fair and equitable to disallow the claim.
Although the doctrine focuses on lack of diligence, and the prejudice it causes, it is
apparent that the nature and quality of the alleged violation of law also play a part in the laches
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analysis. The gravity of the offense, and the extent to which it was obvious or should have been
obvious, to the alleged wrongdoer, are also considerations. As a practical matter a lesser slight
may be dismissed more easily on laches than a greater one even if the delay and prejudice to
others are the same in both cases. This is only right because the inquiry is one in equity, seeking
to balance the various consequences felt by the affected parties. As the Utah Supreme Court
stated in FLDS v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, f 28, 238 P.3d 1054: "In determining whether to apply
the doctrine of laches, we consider the relative harm caused by the petitioner's delay, the relative
harm to the petitioner, and whether or not the respondent acted in good faith."
In the instant case, when these three factors are folly considered, there is on the present
state of the record no basis for a finding of laches, especially with respect to the state's
continuing administration of the Trust. As for the first consideration, the length of the delay, the
plaintiffs' first filing asserting their constitutional claims was in October, 2008 before this court.
That was shortly after the plaintiffs had been denied standing to intervene in the state probate
action, approximately four years after the Utah Attorney General petitioned the state court and
three years after the district court reformed the Trust. All of the reasons for the plaintiffs' delay
until 2008 to assert their constitutional rights are not known but some of them have been asserted
as part of the record in this case. They include: (1) after Warren Jeffs declared in 2004 "to
answer them nothing," the members of his church (the plaintiffs here) took no legal action in
response to the Attorney General's petition; (2) a belief at some point in that earlier period that
the FLDS members, again following their prophet, might be abandoning their homes and
property in Southern Utah and relocating to Texas or some other location; (3) a general lack of
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communication from the FLDS church leaders among themselves and their followers, and a good
deal of confusion about how to deal with the unfolding situation, which included the fact that
their prophet was facing serious criminal charges in Utah state court and that he and the Trust
had been sued in two tort lawsuits in Utah state courts; (4) a belief based on the first two orders
granted by the Utah court that the Special Fiduciary had relatively limited authority that focused
primarily on seeing that taxes were paid and that the tort lawsuits were properly defended; and
(5) the fact that the plaintiffs themselves were not parties in the proceedings and therefor under
no obligation to do anything.
During the first three years after the state case was commenced, then, on the current state
of the record, it appears the plaintiffs' failure to seek legal redress was based on following the
counsel of their religious leaders and on the belief, or hope, that the actions of the state would

<

not be sufficiently violative of their rights as to necessitate legal action in the courts. During this
time it is also significant to recognize that the plaintiffs did not leave their homes or property.
i

They did not relocate to Texas. They stayed on the Trust property in Hildale and Colorado City,
while they watched the actions of the Special Fiduciary become a reality in their everyday lives.
When this case was filed in 2008, the circumstances had changed significantly for at least
two interrelated reasons: (1) Warren Jeffs changed his position and apparently instructed his
followers to get legally involved and (2) the Special Fiduciary had taken steps in administering
the Trust to do things that the FLDS members felt could not be tolerated. These included the
decision to sell the Berry Knoll Farm property, which many of the FLDS community felt had
special spiritual importance, and the planned final subdivision of their homes and property. In
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addition, there were a variety of smaller actions that if allowed to happen would cause
irreparable harm to the FLDS members.
Accordingly, the plaintiffs altered their course in 2008 by filing this lawsuit. Thereafter,
this court is well aware of the details that have caused the case to proceed without any final
action by the court on the motion for injunctive relief. The main reasons have been (1) an
extensive effort at reaching a mediated settlement, and (2) a stay of this action while the
plaintiffs' Petition for Extraordinary Writ was dealt with by the Utah Supreme Court.
These circumstances do not amount to the type of inexcusable delay that supports the
dismissal of plaintiffs' claims of serious constitutional violations on the basis of laches. This is
particularly the case with respect to the state's continuation of its administration of the Trust.
While it is true the plaintiffs could have acted sooner, their reasons and actions under all the
circumstances have not been sufficiently unreasonable to warrant a finding of laches.
Turning to the injury caused to the state actors and others by the plaintiffs' waiting until
2008 to file this case, the injury, if any, is also not sufficient to serve as a basis for applying
laches, even if the plaintiffs failed to bring their case with appropriate diligence. The injury
caused by the plaintiffs' delay in bringing their claims falls into three categories: (1) the Special
Fiduciary's own unpaid bills; (2) the settlements that were reached in the two tort lawsuits; and
(3) other (mostly unidentified) decisions made and positions taken based on the Special
Fiduciary's actions. None of these equal the kind of obligations, expectations, and dependencies
that warrant the extraordinary remedy of laches, a remedy which would place the payment of the
Special Fiduciary's accountants and lawyers (from money earned from the sale of plaintiffs' own
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property) ahead of the plaintiffs' rights to receive a fair hearing on their constitutional claims.
The tort lawsuit settlements certainly can be dealt with by the same legal system that one
would expect to be able to allow these plaintiffs to somewhere obtain a ruling on the merits of
their constitutional claims.
If the plaintiffs had abandoned their property and moved to Texas, or if they had waited a
considerably longer period of time before seeking redress of their constitutional rights, or even if
the damages and injury to the state and third parties was irreparable or more extensive, laches
may be an appropriate remedy, but on the current state of the record the case for laches is not
made. This is especially true given this court's view, as expressed above, that the defendants'
actions were, and continue to be, in clear violation of the Establishment Clause and most likely
in violation of the Free Exercise rights of the plaintiffs. On the present state of the record, it
would be inequitable in the extreme to dismiss this case in its entirety on the basis of laches and
thereby allow these serious constitutional violations to multiply and get worse.
This court is aware of no case where laches has been found under circumstances similar
to the instant case. This includes the critical fact that the unconstitutional violation is an
everyday ongoing reality. Every passing day, the thousands of FLDS members who brought this
case are experiencing the actions and decisions of a state appointed fiduciary regarding the
property in which they live. The 1998 Trust may have been reformed three years ago but its
illegal administration by the state is happening with every passing day. To apply laches in this
situation would be to place the violation of the First Amendment behind the fees and expenses of
the very state actors, and those of the (mostly) former, and now disaffected, members of the
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FLDS church who have encouraged the state actors to take over the Trust. If the defendants are
in territory where they are constitutionally not permitted to be, the law should require their
eviction, not sanction their continued presence just so they can be paid for the invasion.
Res Judicata
Regarding res judicata, the defendants claim this court is bound by the Utah Supreme
Court's finding of laches and must dismiss the case. The plaintiffs agree that this remedy is
required if the Utah Supreme Court's ruling is considered to be on the merits for res judicata
purposes, but they contend it was not. Defendants, obviously, disagree. Both sides, however,
agree that the law of the state of Utah on this point is not settled.
Nor do the parties agree on the general state of the law in other federal or state
jurisdictions. They both claim support in a proper application of Rule 41(b) of the Federal and
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. They both insist that the cases cited by their opponent(s) are
misrepresented and inapposite. They both contend the cases from other jurisdictions are strongly
in their favor, and they insist a ruling not in their favor would be a serious miscarriage of justice.
Currently, there is no clear precedent from the Utah Supreme Court or any other Utah
state court regarding whether laches always constitutes a "judgment on the merits" for res
judicata purposes. Plaintiffs argue that Utah would not find laches to provide a basis for res
judicata in the circumstances of this case because to do so would be inconsistent with Utah law
that holds that dismissal of a claim on the basis of a statute of limitations violation is not a
judgment on the merits. They also assert that Utah has "drawn its descriptions of Utah
preclusion law from California," which has held that judgments on the basis of laches are not on
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the merits for res judicata purposes. See Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978);
Plaintiffs' Opening Mem. at 43.
Furthermore, plaintiffs point to the Utah Supreme Court's decision in the recent FLDS
case where the court stated "[w]e decline to reach the merits of these claims," 239 P.3d at 1066,
as evidence that the decision was not on the merits for res judicata purposes.
Moreover, in supplemental briefing, the plaintiffs assert that because of the unique nature
of the action before the Utah Supreme Court—a Petition for Extraordinary Writ, which is
discretionary in nature, as apposed to an appeal as of right—a finding of res judicata would be
improper. And, finally the plaintiffs argue that "the overwhelming majority of courts and
commentators hold that a laches or limitations dismissal in state court does not preclude a
subsequent action in a federal court or a different state court." (Plaintiffs' Supp. Reply Brief
Regarding Res Judicata Issue at 3.)
Defendants, on the other hand, contend that the Utah Supreme Court's ruling is
preclusive under the Full Faith and Credit statute, that it is "on the merits" for res judicata
purposes pursuant to controlling Utah law, and they cite many policy reasons which should
prevent this court from considering the instant case. The defendants recognize that there is no
direct guidance from the Utah Supreme Court on this issue, but assert that Utah would be
inclined to follow the law of Arizona in this area, citing Day v. Wiswall's Estate, 381 P.2d 217
(Arizona 1963), in which the Arizona Supreme Court held that laches constitutes a judgment on
the merits for res judicata purposes.
A close inspection of the arguments of the parties and the underlying reasons supporting
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the doctrines of laches and res judicata leads this court to the opinion that in the circumstances of
this case, the Utah Supreme Court's finding of laches was not a judgment on the merits for res
judicata purposes. Accordingly, this court is not precluded from further action in this case.
To begin with, it is well to remember that general notions of fairness provide the basis for
both the doctrines of res judicata and laches. They both recognize the essential fairness in the
view that at some point litigation over a particular controversy must come to an end. The law
recognizes that while every person is entitled to his day in court, that is, a full and fair
opportunity to be heard, that person is not necessarily entitled to a second day, or a third. As one
court aptly put it, "there is justice too in an end to conflict and the quiet of peace."
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Alexander, 614 F.2d 474, 481 (5th Cir. 1980).
Accordingly, the common law of equity developed to deny opportunities to mount additional or
collateral attacks on legal issues which already had an opportunity to be presented for resolution
in a court with jurisdiction. This is the essence of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. Initially, each of these doctrines strictly required a final judgment on the merits. Over
time, however, "the meaning of the term 'judgment on the merits' has gradually undergone
change and has come to be applied to some judgments that do not pass entirely upon the
substantive merits of a claim," 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 540 (2010), and pursuant to various
statutes and court decisions, some "judgments not passing directly on the substance of the claim"
have nevertheless operated as a bar under res judicata and collateral estoppel rationales. Id.
The Arizona Supreme Court opinion in Day v. Wiswall's Estate, 381 P.2d 217 (Ariz.
1963), is an example of one of these court decisions that recognized preclusive effect even when
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the earlier proceeding was technically not decided on the merits but rather on the basis of laches.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. City ofLoma Linda, 5 P.3d 874 (Cal.
2000), also a case where the underlying litigation was dismissed on the basis of laches, comes to
a different conclusion, finding that the laches ruling was not on the merits for res judicata
purposes. Under the current state of the law, then, it is apparent there are times when laches is
deemed to support the application of res judicata and there are also times when it is not. While
all of the reasons for such different results are not entirely clear, and may vary from court to
court, it appears that one common element, and one that makes the Arizona and California
decisions consistent with each other, is whether the underlying case in which laches was found
included a fair examination of the circumstances and merits of the suit. This principle was
clearly an important factor in both the Arizona and California cases.
Day, the Arizona case, involved an action brought by a plaintiff seeking a declaration that
portions of her stepmother's estate should be held in constructive trust for her benefit. 381 P.2d
at 218-19. The plaintiff claimed to be an heir to l/22nd of her father's California estate, and to
one-half of her mother's California-based community property. The mother died in 1899 and the
father in 1911. Some 50 years after the distribution of this property to her stepmother, the
plaintiff claimed she could still trace the property.
The plaintiff brought suits against the same parties in both Arizona and California.
While the Arizona case was pending appeal, a judgment was rendered in the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, California dealing with the same property, issues, and parties as those
brought by the plaintiff in Arizona. At the conclusion of a trial "upon the facts," the California
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court made a finding of laches against the plaintiff, in pertinent part, as follows:
The separate and community interests [which plaintiff seeks to reach] * * * have
been so intermingled over the period of approximately 56 years that it would now be
inequitable to segregate and evaluate such interest separately, and for such delay
plaintiff is guilty of laches insofar as she seeks relief under actions * * * No. 666,006
* * * [and] No. 714,004.
Id. at 220.
The plaintiff claimed that the Arizona court should not give preclusive effect to the
California decision because it was on the basis of laches and therefore not "on the merits." In
disagreeing with her, the Arizona Supreme Court stated, "the doctrine of laches is properly
applied only after a consideration of the circumstances and merits of a suit," and that "[t]he
judgment in the California suit was not one of dismissal, but, after a full hearing and
consideration of evidence and a finding of laches as a fact, was that the plaintiff take nothing by
reason of the actions. It was therefore a judgment on the merits." Id, at 220 (emphasis in
original).
The California case, Johnson v. City ofLoma Linda, stated that "a judgment denying a
petition for writ of administrative mandate because of the defense of laches is not a judgment on
the merits for purposes of res judicata." 5 P.3d at 884. The court explained that "[a] judgment is
on the merits for purposes of res judicata if the substance of the case is tried and determined,"
and that under California law "[t]he defense of laches has nothing to do with the merits of the
cause against which it is asserted

The telling consideration must be that laches constitutes

an affirmative defense which does not reach the merits of the cause" Id. (internal quotations
and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The court concluded its opinion with the
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following:
The City notes that the doctrine of res judicata promotes the public policies of giving
certainty to legal proceedings, preventing parties from being unfairly subjected to
repetitive litigation, and preserving judicial resources. These public policies, the
City argues, would be promoted if we were to hold that a trial court's ruling on the
basis of laches is a judgment on the merits. What the City overlooks, however, is
that the doctrine of res judicata also requires that the prior dispute be resolved on its
merits. That requirement would not be satisfied if we were to adopt the City's
argument.
Id. at 884 (internal citations omitted).
In the recent FLDS case, the Utah Supreme Court identifies the doctrine of laches in Utah
as follows:
The length of what constitutes a lack of diligence depend[s] on the circumstances of
each case, because the propriety of refusing a claim is equally predicated upon the
gravity of the prejudice suffered . . . and the length of [the] delay. In determining
whether to apply the doctrine of laches, we consider the relative harm caused by the
petitioner's delay, the relative harm to the petitioner, and whether or not the
respondent acted in good faith. Further, reasonable delay caused by an effort to
settle a dispute does not invoke the doctrine of laches.
FLDS v. Lindberg, 2010 UT 51, Tf 28 (internal quotations and footnotes omitted).
Under this definition, the court recognizes an obligation to perform an assessment of the
merits of the plaintiffs' case in addition to the factors of delay and prejudice to others. In this
regard, the Utah Supreme Court takes the same view of the definition of laches as the Arizona
Supreme Court, that is, laches requires the consideration of the circumstances and merits of a
suit. In the FLDS case, however, aside from the Utah Supreme Court's bare statement that
laches entails a consideration of "the relative harm to the petitioner," the court undertakes no
assessment of any kind whatsoever as to whether the plaintiffs' claims of serious constitutional
violations had any merit at all. There is no attention given to whether the state district court's
40 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reformation of the Trust was in violation of the First Amendment or whether the day-to-day
administration and management of the Trust property constituted the ongoing serious
constitutional violations on which the plaintiffs' case was based. Attention was devoted solely
to discussing the delay and the alleged prejudice caused by the delay. Under these
circumstances, the "merits" of plaintiffs' case were not considered. The "relative harm to the
petitioner" (the plaintiffs) was not even mentioned. As a result, the plaintiffs have not yet had a
forum in which their claims of serious constitutional violations have been entertained or
addressed sufficiently to earn a finding that they were on the merits.
In the final analysis, it appears from the case law, and in particular the cases from
Arizona and California cited by the parties, that laches is entitled to preclusive effect in some
cases, namely where there is some appropriate attention paid to the merits, and not in others. In
this regard Utah law is in accordance with both the Arizona and California decisions. The Utah
Supreme Court announced in FLDS a definition of laches that is the same as the Arizona high
court. (Compare Utah's "In determining laches . . . we consider the relative harm caused by the
petitioner's delay, the relative harm to the petitioner, and whether or not the respondent acted in
good faith," with Arizona's "The doctrine of laches is properly applied only after a consideration
of the circumstances and merits of a suit."). Accordingly, it would be expected that the Utah
court would take a similar approach to finding laches as having preclusive effect only when, as
in the Day case, there was a "full hearing and consideration of evidence" in the underlying
action. If there is no such consideration of the merits, laches would not have preclusive effect.2
2

The defendants' brief supports this court's view that the merits of the claim must receive
some consideration by a court before a laches finding will have preclusive effect. The Arizona
41
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That is unquestionably what happened in FLDS. Therefore, consistent with the Day case, there
is no res judicata effect from Utah's decision in FLDS.
On the other hand, Utah law is also consistent with California's law, announced in the
Johnson case, if a finding of laches is based only on a consideration of (1) delay by the plaintiff
and (2) prejudice to the defendant (and third parties), and does not consider the merits of the
plaintiffs suit. If that is the definition of laches, or if that is the way the doctrine is applied, then
the result is a finding of no preclusive res judicata effect, as was the California court's holding in
Johnson. Any reading of the FLDS case shows that the Utah Supreme Court focused solely on
delay and prejudice (to the defendants) and nothing more.
Furthermore, the court finds merit in the plaintiffs' argument that the discretionary nature
of the relief available under the Petition for Extraordinary Writ makes a finding of res judicata
inappropriate here. See Plaintiffs' Supp. Brief Regarding Res Judicata Issue at pp.4-9. In State
v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 127 P.3d 682, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that a party seeking
relief under such a Petition "has no right to receive a remedy that corrects a lower court's
mishandling of a particular case. Rather, whether relief is ultimately granted is left to the sound
discretion of the court hearing the petition." Id. at \ 23.
The Barrett court compared the decision whether to grant relief pursuant to a petition for
extraordinary writ to a decision whether to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari. "The exercise

Attorney General explains to the court on page 20 of his brief that "A statute of limitations bar
looks only to the timing of the filing of the earlier action, whereas laches requires inquiry into
the merits of the claim." He also refers the court to the Utah Supreme Court's definition of
laches as requiring consideration of "the relative harm to the petitioner," (page 15 and again on
page 20), to emphasize why this court should give res judicata effect to the Utah Supreme
Court's opinion in the instant case.
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of the court's discretion when deciding whether to grant rule 65B(d) extraordinary relief is akin
to this court's exercise of its certiorari review powers. Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure states that '[r]eview by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion and will be granted only for special and important reasons.'" Id. at % 24 (quoting Utah
R. App. P. 46(a)). It was under these circumstances in which the Utah Supreme Court decided in
its sole discretion not to grant the Writ in the FLDS petition. In doing so, the court specifically
stated that "we decline to reach the merits of these claims." FLDS, 2010 UT 51, f 43. In this
regard, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 41(b), it appears the Utah Supreme Court in its dismissal
order was signaling that the decision was not operating "as an adjudication on the merits."3
For the above reasons and based on the other authorities cited in the plaintiffs'
supplemental briefing, the court finds the Utah Supreme Court's decision in FLDS was not on
the merits for the purposes of res judicata.
Other Issues/Defenses
As addressed above, the defendants have asserted many defenses arguing that this court
lacks jurisdiction, or that even if this court has jurisdiction, it should not exercise it. And, as
stated, the defendants also address, albeit sparingly and unconvincingly, the substance of the
plaintiffs' constitutional claims. But, in addition to these assertions in defense of their actions,
the defendants also devote large amounts of their briefs, and attention in oral argument, to

3

Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "Unless the court in its order
for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not
provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or
for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an adjudication on the merits." (emphasis added).
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is virtually identical to the Utah rule.
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addressing the bad character and alleged criminal wrongdoing of Warren Jeffs. The purpose of
these pronouncements, as best the court can make of them, is to persuade this court that it should
find the state action constitutionally proper because to find otherwise would allow Warren Jeffs
(and presumably his followers) to obtain the Trust property and use it to carry out wrongful and
criminal acts. The defendants point, in particular, to Mr. Jeffs' alleged sexual abuse of minors
through illegal arranged marriages of young girls to older men and by other means.
The defendants assert that if the state court were to terminate the Trust, as opposed to
reforming and managing it, and thereby allow it to be revoked according to its own terms, the
Trust property would revert to Warren Jeffs, as president and corporation sole of the FLDS
church. This result, they claim, cannot be allowed to happen because Jeffs would simply
continue to use the Trust property for nefarious purposes. They point out that he and the Trust
were sued in the tort lawsuits on claims of illegal sexual abuse of minors, and that he was
prosecuted criminally for such activity in Utah and is currently facing similar charges in Texas.
They also cite instances where Mr. Jeffs has made statements that show he is manipulating the
Trust property to assist him in his illegal behavior.
The tort lawsuit claimants have sought to intervene in this case with similar rhetoric.
They refer to Mr. Jeffs' criminal acts as "the elephant in the room" and argue that the Special
Fiduciary must be allowed to continue his work in order to restrict Mr. Jeffs' ability to utilize the
Trust and its property in aid of his criminal abuses against minors and other wrongful behavior.
All of these accusations and pronouncements are not lost on the court. But they lack
relevance to the question whether the state actors violated the constitutionally established
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boundaries between church and state by their virtual remake and takeover of the 1998 Trust.
The fact of the matter is that the state court based its decision to reform the Trust, and turn its
administration over to the Special Fiduciary, on the malfeasance of Warren Jeffs and the other
trustees in failing to defend the tort lawsuits and thereby subject the Trust property to possible
default judgments. Although the defendants asserted in oral argument, and suggest in their
briefs, that part of the reason for reforming the Trust was because of a legal determination by the
state court that it was being used to facilitate illegal activity, there is no support for that
assertion.
While it is true the state court judge in reforming the Trust recognized that the FLDS
church practiced polygamy, which is illegal, and that the Special Fiduciary would not in any
manner be allowed to make Trust administration decisions on the basis of polygamist practices,
the state judge nowhere based her decision to reform or administer the Trust on a finding that it
was being used to commit or support criminal activity. The state-judge's Memorandum
Decision states:
The reasons for reformation are multiple. Earlier in these proceedings the Court
determined that the suspended trustees had "committed [] serious breach[es] of
trust," and demonstrated "unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure . . . to
administer the trust effectively" on behalf of the beneficiaries of the Trust.
Specifically, the suspended trustees and, in particular, Warren Jeffs in his capacity
as FLDS President and President of the Board of Trustees, violated various duties
including the duties of loyalty and 'prudent administration' of the Trust. To be
sure, the Restatement granted the suspended trustees great discretion in managing
the Trust. Nevertheless, the Code provides that even when the controlling trust
instrument uses such terms as "'absolute,' 'sole,' or 'uncontrolled' [discretion,]
the trustee shall exercise discretionary power in good faith in accordance with the
terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries."
While certain specific claims against the suspended trustees may be in
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dispute, there is no question that the suspended trustees failed to defend the Trust
against various lawsuits to which the Trust is a party. By failing to defend the
Trust, the suspended trustees violated the Utah Code, and allowed the Trust to be
exposed to entry of default judgments against it. Entry of judgment in those cases
would permit prevailing parties to seize Trust assets in satisfaction of the
judgment. Additionally, the suspended trustees knowingly and willfully failed to
comply with two Court orders: First, they failed to provide an accounting of Trust
assets. Second, they failed to assist the Special Fiduciary by collecting and
providing information about how the Trust has been administered.
. . . [I]n addition to the problems that have resulted from the trustees'
administrative defaults, the Court's review of the Restatement has led it to
conclude that various dispositive (i.e., substantive) provisions of that instrument
are fundamentally flawed and unworkable. Accordingly, the Court-with the help
of interested parties-will need to address both types of issues as part of the
Trust's reformation.
In the Matter of the United Effort Plan Trust, Case No. 053900848, at Iflf 21 -23.
If there is a case to be made by the states that the property within the FLDS Trust is being
managed and distributed to facilitate sex crimes against minors, or to facilitate polygamy, or to
discriminate against young males within the Church, then the state may wish to make such a case
in the appropriate place and consistent with due process, and seek the appropriate remedies,
which may include forfeiture and confiscation of the Trust property by the state, but there is no
support in the record before the court that such a case was ever made in either Utah or Arizona.
Furthermore, even if such a proceeding had been held, and a decision had been reached
that the Trust property was being used to facilitate crimes, the remedy cannot be one of remaking
the Trust and administering it in the manner employed by the state actors in this case. Such
action, even if it followed a finding of impropriety or criminality in the use of the Trust property,
would still run afoul of the Establishment Clause. It would still improperly involve the state in
taking over a religiously-based program and turning it into a secular one based on new non46 J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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religious rules recognized by the state. It would constitute the type of excessive entanglement
between the state and religion not permitted under the Constitution. It is one thing for a state to
tell a church and its members that they, just like all other residents of the state, may not smoke
peyote, or commit child sexual abuse, or violate any other law of general application. And it is
proper to prosecute the offenders and to seek all available legal remedies, such as property
forfeiture. But it is quite another thing, altogether, to reorganize the religious activities of such
churches and their members to make them conform to the states' version of appropriate secular
behavior.
In sum, it is the method the states chose to utilize in dealing with the Trust that this court
finds to offend the Constitution and to support preliminary injunctive relief. There may be other
methods that could reach many of the goals the states seem to be pursuing, but they are of course
not at issue here. The court has listened to the many complaints about Warren Jeffs and the
allegations of his and some of his followers' criminal and tortous misconduct, but finds that
these allegations as a matter of law do not justify the constitutional infirmities of the state action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction, effective immediately, on terms identical to the present Temporary Restraining
Order. A separate order will hereafter be entered further identifying the precise extent of the
preliminary injunction. Defendant Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff s, defendant Arizona
Attorney General Thomas C. Home's, and defendant Denise Posse Lindberg's motions to
dismiss are DENIED. The tort lawsuit claimants' motion to intervene is GRANTED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 24th day of February, 2011.

r

ty^/>
Dee Benson
United States District Judge
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